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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                         
 GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
                I.  PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY 
         Defendant Jonas Stelmokas appeals from a final judgment 
entered August 2, 1995, in favor of the government on six counts 
of its seven-count complaint seeking judgment on seven discrete 
bases revoking Stelmokas's citizenship and ordering him to 
surrender his certificate of naturalization.  The court entered 
judgment in favor of Stelmokas on a seventh count of the 
complaint. 
         The government initiated this action on June 15, 1992, 
by filing the complaint against Stelmokas in the district court 
pursuant to section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952, as amended ("INA").  8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).  The government 
sought judgment revoking and setting aside the judgment of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania which admitted Stelmokas to citizenship in 1955.  It 
further sought judgment canceling Stelmokas's certificate of 
naturalization.   
         In its complaint, the government alleged that Stelmokas 
was born in Moscow, Russia, and resided in Lithuania commencing 
in 1930.  From 1936 until 1939 Stelmokas attended the Lithuanian 
army officers' school in Kaunas, Lithuania, from which he 
graduated in 1939.  From August 1939 until July 1940 Stelmokas 
was an officer in the Lithuanian army. 
         The complaint alleged that in June 1941 the armed 
forces of Nazi Germany occupied Lithuania, which occupation 
continued until August 1944.  During the occupation, the Germans 
organized armed Lithuanian units known as Schutzmannschaft to 
assist the Germans in the occupation and in the persecution of 
Jews and other unarmed persons on the basis of their race, 
religion, national origin, or political opinion.  The Germans 
also organized Schutzmannschaft in other countries who arrested, 
detained, assaulted, and murdered victims in Poland, Ukraine, 
Byelorussia, and other areas.  The Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft in 
Kaunas assisted the Germans in confining and murdering Jews.  The 
government contended that Stelmokas was a voluntary member and 
officer of the Schutzmannschaft and advocated, assisted, 
participated, and acquiesced in the murder and persecution of 
Jews and other unarmed civilians in Lithuania.  Around August 
1944, at the time the German occupation of Lithuania ended, 
Stelmokas entered the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) in the 91st 
Light Flak Replacement Unit. 
         The complaint further alleged that in July 1949 
Stelmokas sought a determination from the United States Displaced 
Persons Commission ("DPC") that he was a displaced person as 
defined in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 ("DPA"), Pub. L. No. 
80-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), and therefore was eligible 
to immigrate to the United States.  In connection with his 
application, a DPC analyst interviewed Stelmokas.  He did not 
inform the analyst that he had served in the Schutzmannschaft or 
the Luftwaffe.  Rather, Stelmokas falsely claimed that he had 
been a teacher in Seda, Lithuania, from July 1940 until August 
1943.  He claimed that he then was unemployed in Kaunas until 
July 1944, and was a laborer in Dresden, Germany, from 1944 until 
March 1945.  The complaint alleged that in 1949 the DPC regarded 
the Schutzmannschaft to be "inimical" to the United States, 
meaning it was a hostile movement. 
         The complaint further stated that, in reliance on 
Stelmokas's misrepresentations, the DPC analyst concluded that 
Stelmokas was eligible for displaced person status, and that the 
DPC so certified him on July 8, 1949.  On or about August 10, 
1949, Stelmokas applied for a visa to enter the United States.  
In connection with that application, Stelmokas repeated to an 
American vice-consul in Hamburg, Germany, the benign wartime 
history that he had related to the DPC analyst and omitted his 
actual wartime employment history.  Based on Stelmokas's false 
representations, the vice-consul approved Stelmokas's application 
for a visa.  Stelmokas then entered the United States as a 
displaced person and permanent resident on August 31, 1949. 
         The complaint asserted that on or about November 12, 
1954, Stelmokas filed an application for naturalization with the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.  Again, Stelmokas 
misrepresented under oath his personal history by claiming that 
the only organization to which he belonged before 1945 was the 
Lithuanian Boy Scouts.  Thus, he concealed his membership in the 
Schutzmannschaft and the Luftwaffe.  On April 11, 1955, the 
district court granted his petition for naturalization. 
         The government requested that the court revoke 
Stelmokas's naturalization for the following reasons:  (1) he 
illegally procured his naturalization because he was ineligible 
for a visa to enter the country as he had assisted in persecuting 
civilian populations (Count I); (2) he illegally procured his 
naturalization because he was ineligible to enter the country as 
he voluntarily had assisted enemy forces during World War II in 
their operations against the United Nations (Count II); (3) he 
illegally procured his naturalization because as a member of the 
Schutzmannschaft and the 91st Light Flak Replacement Unit he was 
ineligible to enter the country because he had been a member of 
and participated in movements hostile to the United States (Count 
III); (4) he illegally procured his naturalization because he had 
misrepresented his wartime service to the DPC and to the vice- 
consul and thus was ineligible to enter the country (Count IV); 
(5) he illegally procured his naturalization because he was 
ineligible for a visa as he had advocated or acquiesced in 
activities or conduct contrary to civilization and human decency 
on behalf of Axis countries during World War II and thus was 
ineligible to enter the country (Count V); (6) he illegally 
procured his naturalization as his participation in the Nazi 
program of persecution demonstrated that he was not of good moral 
character and thus he was ineligible to enter the country (Count 
VI); and he illegally procured his naturalization by concealing 
and misrepresenting material facts, i.e., his service in the 
Schutzmannschaft and the 91st Light Flak Battalion when he filed 
his petition for naturalization (Count VII). 
         Stelmokas filed an answer to the complaint in which he 
admitted the historical facts regarding the German occupation of 
Lithuania and admitted that he had applied for entry into the 
United States as a displaced person.  However, he refused to 
answer the allegations in the complaint regarding his wartime 
activities as he claimed "that his answers could be used against 
him in criminal proceedings in the United States and other 
countries."  The government then moved to compel Stelmokas to 
answer the complaint on the ground that Stelmokas could not rely 
on the Fifth Amendment to refuse to answer.  
         On April 16, 1993, the district court granted the 
government's motion as it concluded that either the sections of 
federal law under which Stelmokas feared prosecution were 
inapplicable to him or the statute of limitations barred 
prosecutions under them.  Thus, the court concluded that 
Stelmokas did not face a real and substantial threat of 
prosecution in the United States.  The court also found that 
Stelmokas did not face a real and substantial threat of 
prosecution in "other countries," and thus it had no need to 
determine whether the Fifth Amendment applied to foreign 
prosecutions.  The court, however, protected Stelmokas by 
ordering that his answer be filed under seal.  Stelmokas never 
complied with the order and did not file an amended answer.  
Furthermore, at a deposition on August 4, 1993, Stelmokas pleaded 
the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer questions germane to 
this case. 
         The court conducted a bench trial from February 27, 
1995, until March 3, 1995.  At the outset of the trial 
Stelmokas's attorney pointed out that Stelmokas had pleaded the 
Fifth Amendment.  He then indicated that he wanted to keep his 
options open and that he did not know what he would advise 
Stelmokas to do.  He said that Stelmokas "may waive the 
privilege."  Stelmokas, however, did not waive the privilege and 
did not testify at the trial. 
         The district court decided the case in a comprehensive 
memorandum opinion dated August 2, 1995.  In its opinion the 
court set forth the background of Stelmokas's application to come 
to the United States and his obtaining citizenship.  The court 
noted that citizenship is a precious right which once conferred 
may not be revoked lightly.  Consequently, the government in a 
denaturalization proceeding must prove its case by clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence so as not to leave the 
issue, i.e., the basis for denaturalization, in doubt.  Kungys v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 1547 (1988); 
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505, 101 S.Ct. 737, 747 
(1981).  The court noted, however, that aliens have no right to 
naturalization unless all statutory requirements are complied 
with.  Consequently, every certificate of citizenship is granted 
on the condition that the government may revoke it if it was not 
issued in accordance with the applicable requirements.  
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506, 101 S.Ct. at 747. 
         The court pointed out that section 340(a) of the INA 
provides the statutory bases for revocation of citizenship:  that 
the citizenship had been "illegally procured" or "procured by 
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation."  
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).  The court then indicated that citizenship is 
"illegally procured" when obtained without compliance with the 
statutory requirements for naturalization.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 
at 506, 101 S.Ct. at 747.  When Stelmokas was naturalized in 
1955, the INA required that he reside continuously in the country 
for at least five years after being lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.  8 U.S.C. § 1427.  See United States v. 
Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 63 & n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
         The court then observed that the DPA authorized the 
issuance of immigration visas to eligible European "displaced 
persons" without regard to immigration quotas, but that persons 
who "assisted the enemy in persecuting the civilian populations" 
of countries that were members of the United Nations or 
voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of  
World War II in their operations against the United Nations were 
not displaced persons.  DPA § 2(b), 62 Stat. 1009, 3051-52 
(incorporating by reference International Refugee Organization 
Constitution's definition of displaced person).  See Fedorenko, 
449 U.S. at 495 & n.3, 101 S.Ct. at 741 & n.3.  Additionally, DPA 
§ 13 prohibited the issuance of visas to "any person who is or 
has been a member of, or participated in, any movement which is 
or has been hostile to the United States or the form of 
government of the United States."  62 Stat. 1014.  Section 10 of 
the DPA provided that any "person who shall willfully make a 
misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission into the 
United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter 
not be admissible into the United States."  62 Stat. 1013. 
         The court further noted that at the time of Stelmokas's 
immigration in 1949, a State Department regulation forbid the 
issuance of a visa to any alien who had "advocated or acquiesced 
in activities or conduct contrary to civilization and human 
decency on behalf of the Axis countries" during World War II.  
The court also indicated that when Stelmokas was naturalized in 
1955, the law provided that citizenship could be conferred only 
on persons "of good moral character, attached to the principles 
of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to 
the good order and happiness of the United States."  8 U.S.C. § 
1427(a)(3).  Finally, the court pointed out that the INA provided 
that citizenship procured by willful concealment or 
misrepresentation of a material fact must be revoked.  8 U.S.C. § 
1451. 
         The district court made an evidentiary ruling in its 
opinion that Stelmokas challenges on this appeal.  It noted that 
Stelmokas had pleaded the Fifth Amendment in his answer and had 
refused on Fifth Amendment grounds to answer questions at his 
deposition.  Furthermore, Stelmokas had not testified at trial.  
The court held that Stelmokas's attorney's statement at the 
outset of the trial that Stelmokas "may waive the privilege" was 
not a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, but was 
the opposite, since it was not a statement that the privilege was 
waived.  The court then held that since the case was civil rather 
than criminal it, as the finder of fact, could infer from 
Stelmokas's invocation of the privilege against self- 
incrimination that his testimony would have been unfavorable.  
See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1558 
(1976).  The court indicated, however, that while it could draw 
adverse inferences from Stelmokas's claim of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, it would not base its findings of 
fact on adverse inferences.  Rather, the court would use 
Stelmokas's invocation of the Fifth Amendment for "independent 
and additional support" for its findings of fact. 
         In its findings of fact, the court preliminarily noted 
that the government had called four witnesses, two experts on the 
Holocaust, Dr. Raul Hilberg and Michael MacQueen, and two 
survivors of the Holocaust in Lithuania, David Levine and Abe 
Malnick.  In addition, the government introduced numerous 
documents into evidence.  Stelmokas did not call any witnesses 
but did introduce three documents into evidence.  The court 
pointed out that Hilberg was a particularly credible witness with 
a remarkable knowledge of the documents placed into evidence. 
         The court noted that many of the documents in evidence 
had been stored in the archives of the former Soviet Union.  
While Stelmokas argued that the documents were not trustworthy, 
the court rejected this contention because Hilberg's and 
MacQueen's testimony established that they were authentic.  
Indeed, Hilberg testified that he was not aware of a single World 
War II Soviet Union archival document that was a forgery.  The 
court concluded that the government "amply established the 
authenticity and trustworthiness of the documents in evidence." 
         The court then related Stelmokas's personal history 
prior to the German invasion, including his graduation from 
military academy and his service as an officer in the Lithuanian 
Army and the Soviet Red Army when the Soviet Union annexed 
Lithuania in 1940.  The court explained that the Germans took 
over Lithuania within a few days of their attack on June 22, 
1941, and that the German army was followed by a police unit 
known as Einsatzgruppen, which implemented the German policy of 
murdering the Jews.  The court related that a segment of the 
indigenous Lithuanian population cooperated with the 
Einsatzgruppen in the murder of the Jews. 
         Starting in late June 1941, the Germans began 
organizing Lithuanians who had fought against the Soviet Union 
into volunteer police battalions.  The Germans controlled these 
units, which became known as the Schutzmannschaft.  Their 
function was to guard installations and prisoners, and they 
guarded the Kaunas ghetto.  The Schutzmannschaft assisted in the 
murder of Jews and other persons. 
         The court found that on July 28, 1941, Stelmokas 
voluntarily enlisted in the Schutzmannschaft and was appointed 
platoon commander in the 7th Company.  The court traced 
Stelmokas's various assignments in the Schutzmannschaft, a 
process made possible by the meticulous record keeping of the 
Schutzmannschaft units, which court opinions demonstrate was 
consistent with the Germans' practice during World War II of 
recording their murderous conduct in specific detail.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25, 27 (S.D. Fla. 1982), 
aff'd, 728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835, 105 
S.Ct. 130 (1984).  By August 30, 1944, Stelmokas had been 
transferred to Germany where he served in the 91st Light Flak 
Replacement Unit of the Luftwaffe.  The records in evidence show 
that Stelmokas was in a military hospital in Germany on February 
12, 1945. 
         The court found that on September 15, 1941, Stelmokas 
was a guard commander at Vilijampole, which was the ghetto in 
Kaunas.  The evidence showed clearly, unequivocally, and 
convincingly, that Stelmokas served as the commander of the 
ghetto guard for at least a 24-hour period commencing on 
September 16, 1941, at 1:00 P.M., and, accordingly, that he 
participated in confining the Jews to an area in which they were 
regularly subjected to extreme deprivation, brutality, and 
arbitrary shootings.  The court then found, through a painstaking 
analysis of the Schutzmannschaft records, that Stelmokas's 
battalion took part in the Grosse Aktion of October 28 and 
October 29, 1941, which involved the murder of precisely 9,200 
Jews, and that Stelmokas was on duty at that time.  Levine and 
Malnik, who were children in the ghetto at the time, supported 
the documentary evidence with eye-witness testimony.  While 
Levine and Malnick did not identify Stelmokas, both testified 
that armed Lithuanians took part in the murders.  The court also 
made findings that Stelmokas participated in anti-partisan 
actions and served in the Luftwaffe. 
         The court found that when Stelmokas applied for 
displaced person status he did not inform the DPC analyst of his 
Schutzmannschaft and Luftwaffe service, and that he 
misrepresented his employment and places of residence for the 
period of July 1940 until March 1945.  The court also noted that 
the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft appeared on a "List of 
Organizations Considered Inimical to the United States" issued by 
the DPC Headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany.  The court found that 
Stelmokas made false statements under oath when he sought his 
visa application, because he misrepresented his wartime 
residences and did not reveal his Schutzmannschaft or Luftwaffeservice.  
The court found that he obtained his visa because of 
the misrepresentation.  The court did not find, however, that 
Stelmokas made false statements when he was naturalized. 
         The court then discussed the adverse inferences to be 
drawn from Stelmokas's claim of the privilege against self- 
incrimination.  It emphasized, however, that the findings of fact 
we have described did not depend on the drawing of inferences 
from Stelmokas's claim of the privilege.  The court said that it 
inferred that Stelmokas's testimony would have revealed that he 
voluntarily joined the Schutzmannschaft and served in it from 
July 1941 until mid-1944, when he was transferred to Germany to 
serve in the 91st Light Flak Battalion; he was commander of the 
ghetto guard at Kaunsas in September 1941; he participated in the 
murdering of Jews in the Grosse Aktion and in fighting against 
anti-German partisans; and he made false representations to both 
the DPC analyst and the vice-consul regarding his wartime 
activities, particularly his service in the Schutzmannschaft and 
the Luftwaffe, to facilitate his immigration to the United 
States. 
         The court then set forth its conclusions of law.  It 
reiterated that the government had to prove its case by clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence, but that under 8 U.S.C. § 
1451(a) Stelmokas's certificate of naturalization must be 
canceled and his citizenship revoked if his citizenship was 
"illegally procured" or "procured by concealment of a material 
fact or by willful misrepresentation."  It also pointed out that 
Stelmokas could not have procured his citizenship lawfully in 
1955 if his admission to permanent residence in 1949 had not been 
lawful.  8 U.S.C. § 1427; Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514-16, 101 
S.Ct. at 750-52. 
         The court held that under the DPA § 2(b), 62 Stat. 
1009, Stelmokas had been ineligible to immigrate to the United 
States because his actions in the Kaunas ghetto assisted the 
enemy in persecuting civilian populations.  Consequently, 
Stelmokas's entry into the United States as a permanent resident 
was unlawful and he had procured his citizenship unlawfully.  
SeeFedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512, 101 S.Ct. at 750 ("an individual's 
service as a concentration camp armed guard -- whether voluntary 
or involuntary -- made him ineligible for a visa").  The court 
then held that Stelmokas also had been ineligible for a visa 
because he voluntarily had assisted enemy forces during World War 
II.  See United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 496-97 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (in banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012, 106 S.Ct. 1188 
(1986).  Thus, for this additional reason, his entry as a 
permanent resident was unlawful and he had procured his 
citizenship unlawfully.  The court next held that the 
Schutzmannschaft was a movement hostile to the United States, so 
that Stelmokas was barred from entering the United States because 
of his membership in it under DPA § 13, 62 Stat. 1014.  
Consequently, he had procured his citizenship illegally. 
         The court held that DPA § 10, 62 Stat. 1013, barred 
Stelmokas from entering the country for permanent residence 
because he willfully had misrepresented material facts to gain 
admission.  In particular, he concealed his Schutzmannschaft and 
Luftwaffe service from the DPC analyst and the vice-consul.  
These concealments were material because they misrepresented the 
facts that he had assisted the enemy in the persecution of 
civilians, voluntarily assisted the Axis powers in their military 
operations, and had been a member of a movement hostile to the 
United States and its form of government.  The court found that 
these misrepresentations would have a natural tendency to 
influence the DPC and the vice-consul in making their decisions 
to classify Stelmokas as a displaced person and to admit him to 
the United States.  Consequently, Stelmokas's entry into the 
United States as a permanent resident was unlawful so he had 
procured his citizenship unlawfully.  See United States v. 
Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 493.   
         The court next held that Stelmokas had procured his 
citizenship unlawfully because he was not entitled to a visa to 
enter the country as a permanent resident as he had advocated or 
acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to civilization and 
human decency on behalf of the Axis countries contrary to the 
regulations then in effect.  The court also held that he did not 
qualify for naturalization because he lacked good moral character 
when he was naturalized, so that he had procured his citizenship 
unlawfully.  8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).  The 
court held that Stelmokas lacked good moral character because he 
voluntarily joined the Schutzmannschaft, enforced the confinement 
of the Jews in the brutal conditions of the Kaunas ghetto, and 
was on duty when his battalion assisted in the Gross Aktion. 
         The court held that the government had not established 
its case in only one respect.  Under the INA, procuring 
citizenship "by concealment of a material fact or by willful 
misrepresentation" is grounds for denaturalization.  8 U.S.C. § 
1451(a).  The court held, however, that concealment must be made 
in order to obtain naturalization for that charge to apply, as 
distinguished from concealment made to obtain a visa.  
Accordingly, the court held that the misrepresentations to the 
DPC analyst and to the vice-consul could not apply to the 
concealment count with respect to procuring citizenship.  The 
court therefore held that the concealment count failed because 
the government did not establish that Stelmokas's statements in 
connection with his naturalization willfully concealed facts or 
included material misrepresentations of fact. 
         The court ended its opinion by reiterating that 
Stelmokas's citizenship could be revoked only on the basis of 
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.  Consequently, the 
government had a heavy burden in the case.  The court then 
emphasized that there was no doubt but that Stelmokas voluntarily 
joined the Schutzmannschaft in 1941 and served in it until mid- 
1944, when he was transferred to a Luftwaffe unit in Germany.  
The court noted that he was the commander of the ghetto guard and 
was on duty in Kaunas during the Gross Aktion, when his battalion 
assisted in the massacre of 9,200 Jews.  Furthermore, the court 
stated that there was no doubt that he fought anti-German 
partisans later in the war, and that he willfully misrepresented 
his wartime activities when he applied for admission to this 
country.  For all these reasons, the court revoked his 
citizenship.  Stelmokas then appealed. 
 
                         II.  DISCUSSION 
         Stelmokas raises four issues on this appeal.  He 
contends that:  (1) the district court erred in drawing adverse 
inferences based on his Fifth Amendment plea; (2) the district 
court erred in admitting as ancient documents records made during 
the German occupation of Lithuania and certain other wartime 
documents; (3) the government failed to establish its case by 
clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence so as not to leave its 
allegations regarding his wartime activities in doubt; and (4) 
his alleged misrepresentations regarding his wartime employment 
and residence were not shown to be material.  We will discuss 
these contentions in the order presented. 
 
 
           A.  The privilege against self-incrimination 
 
         We are perplexed by aspects of Stelmokas's Fifth 
Amendment argument.  He initially contends that the district 
court erred when it held that he did not face a real and 
substantial threat of domestic and foreign prosecution.  Yet we 
do not understand how the alleged error prejudiced him because 
the district court, though overruling his plea of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, did not sanction him for persisting 
with that plea.  The court did not strike Stelmokas's answer, 
deem the allegations of the complaint admitted, enter a default 
judgment against him, preclude him from presenting witnesses 
including even himself, or hold him in contempt.  See S.E.C. v. 
Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 189-91 (3d Cir. 1994).   
         Quite to the contrary, the district court merely drew 
inferences against Stelmokas with respect to what his testimony 
would have revealed had he testified.  Of course, as we shall 
demonstrate, the court could have drawn these inferences even if 
it had upheld Stelmokas's claim of the privilege against self- 
incrimination.  Thus, while the court overruled Stelmokas's plea 
of the Fifth Amendment, its ruling had no consequence because the 
court acted as if it had upheld the plea.  It thus appears that 
to the extent the parties' briefs address whether the court 
correctly overruled the claim of the privilege against self- 
incrimination, they focus on a non-issue.  Therefore, we will not 
consider whether the court correctly held that Stelmokas could 
not plead the privilege against self-incrimination. 
         Stelmokas argues, however, that the court was not 
justified in drawing inferences against him for two reasons. 
First, he suggests that, in view of his attorney's statement at 
trial that Stelmokas "may" waive the privilege, it is not clear 
that he, indeed, did claim the privilege.  Second, he argues that 
"no penalty may be imposed on a witness asserting the privilege" 
against self-incrimination.  Br. at 19. 
         We reject both of these contentions.  First, the court 
was justified in treating the case as though Stelmokas never 
retreated from his claim of the privilege against self- 
incrimination.  Indeed, it hardly could have done otherwise.  
After all, Stelmokas claimed the privilege in his answer and at 
his deposition and he never filed an amended answer as the court 
ordered, or indicate that he would make himself available to 
complete his deposition by answering all the questions asked.  
Rather, his attorney merely said at the trial that he "may" waive 
the privilege, which he never did.   
         In S.E.C. v. Graystone Nash, Inc., we pointed out that 
"because the privilege [against self-incrimination] may be 
initially invoked and later waived at a time when an adverse 
party can no longer secure the benefits of discovery, the 
potential for exploitation is apparent [because abuse may cause] 
unfair prejudice to the opposing litigant." 25 F.3d at 190.  At 
the very least, therefore, if a party initially claims the 
privilege against self-incrimination and then intends to waive 
it, he should do so clearly.  If Stelmokas had waived the 
privilege clearly at the outset of the trial, the government 
could have asked for an opportunity to take a meaningful 
deposition.  Stelmokas's maneuvering precluded that possibility.  
Indeed, Stelmokas's attorney at the trial, without apparent 
recognition of the significance of his statement, essentially 
admitted that he was abusing the claim of the privilege by 
indicating that he was keeping his options open and that he did 
not know what he would advise Stelmokas to do.  We will not 
reward such manipulation.  Rather, Stelmokas must bear its 
consequences. 
         Second, Stelmokas's argument that he cannot be 
penalized for claiming the privilege relies on such cases as 
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 97 S.Ct. 2132 (1977), and 
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616 (1967).  But 
those cases dealt with the imposition of a substantial penalty 
for the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
e.g., the loss of public office.  As we have pointed out, in this 
case the court did not impose any sanction on Stelmokas because 
of his refusal to answer questions. 
         Thus, this case is controlled by the principles set 
forth in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551 
(1976).  There, a prisoner at a disciplinary hearing was advised 
that he had a right to remain silent but that, if he did so, his 
silence would be held against him.  He remained silent and his 
silence was given evidentiary value against him.  The Supreme 
Court held that the use of his silence in this manner was proper.  
It distinguished the line of cases, including Lefkowitz and 
Garrity, that did not allow the imposition of a penalty for 
pleading the privilege because those cases involved the loss of 
employment or the opportunity to contract with the state for 
exercising Fifth Amendment rights.  Id. at 316-17, 96 S.Ct. at 
1557.  The Court also distinguished Griffin v. California, 380 
U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229 (1965), which held that in a criminalcase a jury 
could not be instructed that it could draw an 
inference of guilt from the defendant's failure to testify.  
Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317, 96 S.Ct. at 1557. 
         The Supreme Court in Baxter held that the case was 
controlled by the principle that, in civil cases, "the Fifth 
Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties . . 
. when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence 
offered against them."  Id. at 318, 96 S.Ct. at 1558.  Thus, as 
long as there was independent evidence to support the negative 
inferences beyond the invocation of the privilege against self- 
incrimination, the inferences could be drawn.  See also United 
States v. Local 560 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, etc., 780 
F.2d 267, 292 n.32 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140, 
106 S.Ct. 2247 (1986).  In this case, there was a plethora of 
independent evidence to support the inferences that the district 
court drew based on Stelmokas's claim of the privilege, so the 
court was justified in drawing the inferences it did. 
         We recognize that even though this is a civil case, seeUnited 
States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1981), it 
may have drastic consequences for Stelmokas.  After all, at oral 
argument the attorneys told us that an affirmance probably will 
lead to his deportation.  But the severity of the consequences do 
not alter the legal determination of whether the court may draw 
inferences against a person pleading the privilege against self- 
incrimination.  Baxter itself was a disciplinary case and had 
penal overtones.  We also note that the Supreme Court recently 
has adhered to the sharp distinction between proceedings which, 
though possessing what might be regarded as a punitive impact, 
are civil, and traditional criminal proceedings.  Thus, in United 
States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2138 (1996), the Court held 
that civil forfeitures in general do not constitute punishment 
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Accordingly, the 
Court would not regard a civil forfeiture action as a criminal 
proceeding, even though the proceeding resulted in an owner 
losing his property.  This case cannot be regarded as more 
punitive than Ursery.  In sum, a case is either civil or criminal 
and in the present context this case is civil.   
         We make one final point on the self-incrimination 
argument.  In this case, there was a bench trial.  Thus, unlike a 
jury trial in which a jury will return a general verdict or 
answer specific interrogatories, the district court had an 
opportunity to explain the bases in the evidence for its factual 
findings.  It did so by making it crystal clear that, even if it 
had not drawn any inferences from Stelmokas's claim of the 
privilege, it would have made the same factual findings.  
Accordingly, even if the district court erred in drawing the 
inferences, its error would have been harmless for, as we explain 
below, the evidence without the inferences supported the court's 
findings. 
 
 
                    B.  The ancient documents 
         Stelmokas argues that the district court erred by 
admitting into evidence occupation documents obtained from 
Lithuanian archives and other sources as ancient documents 
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(16) which, as an exception to the 
hearsay rule, allows the admission of "[s]tatements in a document 
in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is 
established."  The challenged documents demonstrated Stelmokas's 
employment and activities during World War II.  In particular, 
Stelmokas argues that these documents "lack any assurance of 
trustworthiness."  Br. at 22. 
         Stelmokas focuses his objection on two groups of 
documents, principally those recovered from the records of the 
Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft that were located at Vilnius, the 
Lithuanian capital, and secondarily those recovered from German 
records found at other locations.  While Stelmokas recognizes 
that Germans or Lithuanians purportedly wrote the 
Schutzmannschaft documents, he observes that the Vilnius 
documents were kept from public inspection by the Soviet Union 
until 1990.  Though he also acknowledges that the government did 
not have to demonstrate a strict chain of custody for the 
documents to be admitted, in his view the documents cannot be 
treated as authentic because it is unclear how they were moved to 
the Vilnius archives.  Thus, he argues that the documents were 
not found in a place where, if authentic, they "would likely be" 
as set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(8). 
         Stelmokas further argues that the documents are 
suspicious because the Germans destroyed many documents 
demonstrating their criminal conduct, but "preserve[d] evidence 
of Lithuanian misconduct."  Br. at 27.  Furthermore, he regards 
the documents as questionable because they came from Soviet 
sources, and he claims that it was Soviet policy to discredit the 
Baltic states.  Id.  Finally, he argues, though with less 
particularly, that the government did not establish the chain of 
custody and authenticity of the second group of documents, i.e., 
those from German sources. 
         We review the district court's ruling that admitted the 
evidence over a challenge to its authenticity under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 
328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 956, 113 S.Ct. 415 (1992).  
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides that the requirement of 
"authentication . . . as a condition precedent to admissibility 
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
matter in question is what its proponent claims."  Rule 901(a) is 
written, of course, in general terms, but is followed by Rule 
901(b) which includes examples of methods by which to 
authenticate evidence.  Rule 901(b)(8) provides that 
authentication of an ancient document may be supplied by a 
demonstration that a document is in such condition as to create 
no suspicion concerning its authenticity, was in a place where, 
if authentic, it likely would be, and has been in existence 20 
years or more at the time it is offered.  Ancient documents are 
admissible into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.  
See United States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976). 
         We cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting the documents in question.  Initially, we 
observe that Stelmokas's argument in part is self-defeating 
because his contention that the Germans destroyed documents 
demonstrating their own criminal conduct, but preserved documents 
incriminating the Lithuanians, supports rather than undermines 
the district court's conclusions that the documents incriminating 
him were legitimate.  Furthermore, the documents were certified 
by competent Lithuanian archival personnel.  Hilberg, who has 
testified in many cases regarding eastern European Holocaust 
records and whose expertise cannot be doubted, testified that the 
documents he examined were authentic and that the documents found 
in Soviet possession are as reliable as documents from western 
countries.  He said that he found the documents to be reliable 
and not to be forgeries.  He also testified that one would expect 
to find documents relating to the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft in 
Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital.   
         MacQueen testified that he personally searched archives 
in Lithuania and that the documents he found were authentic and 
reliable.  In particular, he had found Schutzmannschaft records 
implicating Stelmokas in Vilnius, which is where they were likely 
to be found.  Stelmokas simply has not produced any evidence or 
forwarded any reason to impeach the validity of the documents.  
See Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Exxon Corp., 805 F. Supp. 680, 
711 n.34 (E.D. Wis. 1992), aff'd, 2 F.3d 219 (7th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1304 (1994).   
         We also point out that German records demonstrate that 
while Stelmokas was in the Luftwaffe, he was hospitalized in 
Germany.  We cannot conceive that any rational person would 
believe that someone set out to incriminate Stelmokas and planted 
fake documents in widely-scattered places for that purpose.  If 
anyone created the documents to injure Stelmokas, the fabricator 
most peculiarly placed the bulk of the documents in a location 
where they were not accessible to the public and from which, in 
fact, they were not released for decades.  There certainly is no 
evidence in the record that anyone hatched such a bizarre plot.  
Indeed, Stelmokas does not explain what motivation any person 
would have had to fabricate documents so as to attribute 
responsibility to him for the atrocities in Lithuania or how that 
could have been accomplished.  Stelmokas was hardly a prominent 
figure in the war and it is difficult to conceive why someone 
would go to the lengths he suggests in order to frame him.  
Stelmokas's attack on the authenticity of the documents is not 
substantial.   
 
 
                 C.  Sufficiency of the evidence 
         Stelmokas next argues that the government failed to 
establish its case by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence 
so as to leave no doubt as to its allegations regarding 
Stelmokas's wartime activities.  In considering this allegation, 
we determine whether the district court's findings are clearly 
erroneous.  Oberti v. Board of Ed., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Of course, they will not be clearly erroneous if 
supported by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.   
         We have reviewed the record and have concluded that the 
district court's findings are not clearly erroneous, as the 
evidence in the record fully supports them.  The ultimate factual 
issue for resolution in this case was whether Stelmokas resided 
in the United States for five years "after being lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence."  8 U.S.C. § 1427.  If he was 
not lawfully admitted, he was not eligible for citizenship.  
Resolution of this issue in turn depends on whether the district 
court's findings that Stelmokas should have been barred for six 
different reasons from entering the country were clearly 
erroneous as to all six.  We thus emphasize that even if we 
upheld the findings on only one of the six bases, we would 
affirm.   
         In fact, the government demonstrated beyond all doubt 
that Stelmokas was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
for all six reasons.  The evidence against Stelmokas was 
overwhelming, even without the inferences the court drew from 
Stelmokas's Fifth Amendment plea and, as Stelmokas called no 
witnesses, the evidence was not rebutted.  In the circumstances, 
we would serve no useful purpose in detailing all the evidence to 
support each of the charges against him.   
         We highlight two examples of how Stelmokas argues his 
case.  He contends that there is no proof that he joined the 
Schutzmannschaft voluntarily.  While it is true that no person 
testified that he recalled seeing Stelmokas sign up for the 
Schutzmannschaft, his contention that there is no proof that he 
joined voluntarily ignores the record.  The evidence shows that 
when Stelmokas joined the Schutzmannschaft, service of all its 
officers was voluntary as there was an ample supply of candidates 
and conscription was not necessary.  Indeed, for at least several 
months after Stelmokas joined the Schutzmannschaft, its members 
could be released at their own request.  Obviously, if the 
evidence demonstrated that service of all Schutzmannschaftofficers was 
voluntary, then a finding that a particular officer 
served voluntarily is supported in the record.  We also point out 
that in addition to this positive proof that Stelmokas joined the 
Schutzmannschaft voluntarily, the court drew the entirely 
justified inference from Stelmokas's claim of the privilege 
against self-incrimination that he joined voluntarily. 
         Another example of the weakness of Stelmokas's factual 
arguments is his claim that he did not misrepresent his wartime 
employment by concealing his membership in the Schutzmannschaft.  
This contention is frivolous, for he acknowledges that he 
represented to the DPC analyst and the vice-consul that from 1940 
until 1943 he was a teacher in Seda.  It is difficult to 
understand how Stelmokas can argue that he did not misrepresent 
his status as a Schutzmannschaft officer when he represented that 
he was a teacher for most of the time that he was in reality such 
an officer.  
         Stelmokas, however, takes a different approach to what 
constitutes a misrepresentation.  In a post-argument brief that 
he filed at our direction, he recites that "[a] relevant 
concealment would have occurred if the government had produced 
evidence that Stelmokas was asked if he had been a member of the 
Schutzmannschaft and said no."  Br. at 3.  Thus, Stelmokas would 
require that the examiner have a reason to ask about a specific 
narrowly defined matter.  We reject his approach.  In our view, 
if you falsely represent that your employment is one thing when 
your actual employment is completely different, then you have 
concealed your true employment.  In these circumstances, it is 
perfectly clear that Stelmokas himself demonstrates that he made 
a material misrepresentation when he sought displaced person 
status and a visa.  Surely the misrepresentation that Stelmokas 
was a teacher was material because it hid his true employment as 
a Schutzmannschaft officer. 
         Notwithstanding Stelmokas's failure to mount a 
substantial attack on the court's findings, we focus on two 
aspects of the government's case:  Stelmokas's participation in 
the Schutzmannshaft as a movement hostile to the United States 
and his false statements to the DPC analyst and to the vice- 
consul.  As we indicated, section 13 of the DPA prohibited 
issuance of a visa to any person "who is or has been a member of, 
or participated in, any movement which is or has been hostile to 
the United States or the form of government of the United 
States."  62 Stat. 1014.  It is beyond doubt that Stelmokas was 
an officer in the Schutzmannschaft.  It is also clear that the 
Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft was on the State Department "List of 
Organizations Considered Inimical to the United States."  The 
inimical list states that members of the Schutzmannschaft "are 
considered collaborators except for those members . . . who can 
produce evidence that they were conscripted and did not commit 
atrocities or otherwise persecute civilian populations."  Seeexhibit 
4.242, app. 1672. 
         Stelmokas did not produce any such evidence.  Indeed, 
except for a small number of exhibits, he did not produce any 
evidence at all.  It is clear that Stelmokas voluntarily joined 
the Schutzmannschaft and, while there is no eye-witness testimony 
identifying him as a person who committed atrocities or otherwise 
persecuted the civilian population, the only reasonable inference 
to be drawn from the record is that he did exactly that.  In any 
event, with or without the reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the record, Stelmokas's service as an officer in the 
Schutzmannschaft disqualified him from obtaining displaced person 
status and a visa, as the Schutzmannschaft was a movement hostile 
to the United States.  See United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 
at 497 n.11; United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. at 34; United 
States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. at 78-79.   
         In his post-argument brief, Stelmokas makes disturbing 
contentions with respect to the inimical list.  He indicates that 
"there is no evidence of record as to what, if any [inimical] 
list, was in use in July and August of 1949 when [he] made his 
applications to the [DPC] and the consulate."  He then adds that 
the "government has placed the so-called inimical list in 
evidence but it is undated and there is no testimony as to when 
it was published and whether the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft was 
on the list as early as the summer of 1949, and if so, what 
effect it might have had, if any, on the decision of the DPC 
examiner or vice consul."  Br. at 22. 
         While we agree that there was no testimony at trial as 
to what effect the presence of the Schutzmannschaft on the 
inimical list might have had on the decisions of the examiner or 
the vice-consul, we regard the balance of the quoted statements 
in Stelmokas's brief as material misrepresentations.  Near the 
end of the trial, after the government's witnesses had testified 
and shortly before the government rested, the following 
proceedings took place: 
              THE COURT:  Fine.  What remains to be 
         done today? 
 
              MS. SLAVIN [the government attorney]:  
         Well, we would like to move Exhibit 4.242, 
         which is the inimical list, into evidence.  
         We have reached a stipulation. 
 
              THE COURT:  Let me... 
 
              (Pause in proceedings.) 
 
              THE COURT:  Okay.  It was not received 
         yesterday.  Is it being received -- 
 
              MS. SLAVIN:  We are moving it in -- 
 
              THE COURT:  -- in evidence by agreement 
         or is there a stipulation that you want to 
         read into the record? 
 
              MS. SLAVIN:  The stipulation we have 
         arrived at that was -- that the list was in 
         effect during the relevant period of Mr. 
         Stelmokas' immigration in 1949. 
 
              MR. CARROLL [Stelmokas's attorney]:  And 
         I'm withdrawing my objection to that exhibit, 
         your Honor, for that reason. 
 
              THE COURT:  Exhibit 4.242 will be 
         received in evidence. 
 
              (Government Exhibit 4.242 is admitted 
         into evidence.) 
In the circumstances, it obviously is disingenuous for 
Stelmokas's attorney on this appeal, who was trial counsel as 
well, to challenge the use of the inimical list on the theory 
that the evidence did not show it was in effect when Stelmokas 
sought displaced person status and a visa.  Of course, Exhibit 
4.242 included the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft on the list. 
         In any event, it would not matter if the 
Schutzmannschaft was added to the inimical list after Stelmokas 
obtained displaced person status and a visa and entered the 
country.  Stelmokas was barred from entering the country because 
he was a member of the Schutzmannschaft, which was a movement 
hostile to the United States.  The date that the Schutzmannschaftwas 
placed on the inimical list is not significant for purposes 
of determining if it was a movement hostile to the United States 
because its placement on the list established that it was such a 
movement during World War II when Stelmokas was one of its 
officers.  The inimical list did not operate prospectively so 
that a movement would be regarded as hostile to the United States 
only after it was placed on the list.  After all, the list 
enumerated movements that existed during the Nazi era which ended 
before the list's promulgation.  Therefore, Stelmokas was 
unlawfully admitted to the United States because, regardless of 
when the Schutzmannschaft first appeared on the inimical list, 
when Stelmokas served as a Schutzmannschaft officer it was a 
movement hostile to the United States. 
         The second aspect of the evidence on which we comment 
is Stelmokas' misrepresentations to the DPC analyst and the 
American vice-consul in Hamburg.  Neither the analyst nor the 
vice-consul testified, but it is beyond dispute that when they 
interviewed Stelmokas he told them nothing about his 
Schutzmannschaft and Luftwaffe service.  Rather, he told them 
that during the war he was a teacher in Seda, Lithuania, and was 
then a laborer in Dresden, Germany.  There simply can be no doubt 
but that the district court's findings demonstrate that Stelmokas 
was not eligible to immigrate to the United States.   
 
 
       D.  The materiality of Stelmokas's misrepresentation 
 
         Stelmokas's final argument is that the government did 
not establish that his misrepresentations regarding his wartime 
employment and residence were material.  He contends that the 
"government has usually attempted [to establish] proof of 
materiality in these cases by calling consular or INS officials 
to testify that their decisions would have been different if they 
had known the truth."  Br. at 48.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 496.  He then correctly points out that 
the government did not present any such evidence in this case. 
         Stelmokas's claim for relief on this basis faces the 
insurmountable barrier that even if he is correct, we still must 
affirm.  The district court found for six different reasons, all 
fully supported by evidence in the record, that Stelmokas was 
ineligible for displaced person status and for a visa and thus 
that he had not entered the United States lawfully and had not 
been eligible for citizenship.  Five of these reasons were 
predicated on his conduct and associations during World War II, 
and only one was based on his misrepresentations to the DPC 
analyst and the vice-consul.  Thus, even if Stelmokas had made no 
misrepresentations to the DPC analyst or the vice-consul, we 
would affirm because he procured his citizenship illegally as he 
was not eligible for displaced person status and for a visa.   
         We recognize that a party might contend that if a court 
of appeals rejected any of the bases for a district court's 
conclusion that a defendant should be denaturalized, it should 
remand the case so that the district court then could consider 
whether to grant relief predicated on the findings the court of 
appeals has upheld.  In that event, a finding that a defendant 
had not made material misrepresentations in connection with his 
visa application could be significant.  The problem with such an 
argument is that the courts do not have equitable discretion to 
deny the government a judgment of denaturalization to which it 
otherwise would be entitled.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 517-18, 101 
S.Ct. at 752-53.   Thus, even if we held that Stelmokas's 
misrepresentations were not material and, indeed, even if he made 
no representations at all to obtain the visa, his appeal is 
doomed, as he was not eligible for a visa, and we must uphold the 
district court even if we sustain only one of the bases for its 
conclusion that he had been ineligible to enter the United 
States.  Of course, we are sustaining the district court's 
conclusions on all six counts that Stelmokas was ineligible to 
enter the United States.  Nevertheless, we will address the 
materiality argument on its merits, as it does relate to one of 
the bases for relief.   
         Initially, on this appeal Stelmokas and the government 
agreed that Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 108 S.Ct. 1537 
(1988), set the standard for materiality in this case, even 
though that case concerned materiality in citizenship 
applications under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), rather than 
materiality under section 10 of the DPA.  Thus, in his opening 
brief, Stelmokas said that the "current test of materiality is 
found in Kungys."  Br. at 47.  Indeed, in his "Statement of 
Issues" he included the following:  "Were the defendant's 
misrepresentations concerning his former occupation and residence 
'material' as defined in Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 
(1988)."  Under Kungys, a misrepresentation is material if it has 
a natural tendency to affect the officers' decisions, in this 
case the decisions of the DPC analyst and the vice-consul.  485 
U.S. at 770-72, 108 S.Ct. at 1546-47.  Furthermore, it is clear 
from Kungys that a misrepresentation can be material even where 
if the truth had been told, the decision maker ultimately would 
have reached the same result.  Under Kungys, the materiality of a 
misrepresentation in a denaturalization proceeding is a legal 
rather than a factual question.  Id. at 772, 108 S.Ct. at 1547. 
         While the government continues to rely on Kungys, 
Stelmokas changed his position in his post-argument brief in 
which he now contends that "Kungys simply did not deal with the 
visa or DPA issues."  Br. at 1.  Furthermore, he cites United 
States v. Gaudin, 115 S.Ct. 2310 (1995), for the first time on 
this appeal in that brief, pointing out that the Supreme Court 
held there that materiality was a factual rather than a legal 
matter in the circumstances of that case.  We would be justified 
in refusing to entertain Stelmokas's post-argument change in 
position, for we do not think that a party should be able to 
change his legal contentions after oral argument.  But, mindful 
of the importance of this case to Stelmokas, we nonetheless will 
discuss his new position.   
         While we cannot predict the ultimate implications of 
Gaudin, we do know that Gaudin did not affect the Kungys holding 
that, in a denaturalization proceeding, materiality of a 
misrepresentation is a legal issue.  Quite the contrary is true 
because the Gaudin court discussed Kungys at length and made it 
clear that it was distinguishing Kungys because that case dealt 
with whether "an appellate court must remand to a district court 
for a determination of materiality in a denaturalization 
proceeding," whereas Gaudin was concerned with a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine materiality in a 
criminal proceeding.  Gaudin, 115 S.Ct. at 2319.   
         Of course, Gaudin followed a familiar track because it 
is not unusual for the Court to extend more extensive procedural 
protections to a defendant in a criminal case than to a party in 
a civil case.  Indeed, as we point out above, the Court in Baxter 
v. Palmigiano distinguished Griffin v. California on the ground 
that Griffin, unlike Baxter, was a criminal case.  Baxter, 425 
U.S. at 317, 96 S.Ct. at 1557.  Thus, while Gaudin may cause 
courts to cabin Kungys to the extent that it holds that a 
determination of materiality is a legal issue, Kungys's treatment 
of materiality as a legal issue remains applicable here. 
         Stelmokas now also seems to contend that because the 
procedure in an application for citizenship differs from that 
under section 10 of the DPA, the definition of what is material 
in Kungys is inapplicable here.  In particular, in his post- 
argument brief, he contends that "Kungys simply did not deal with 
the visa or DPA eligibility issues."  Br. at 1.  This argument is 
distinct from Stelmokas's contention that materiality is a 
factual question.  We reject this attempt to distinguish Kungys.  
While the procedures followed and questions asked when an 
applicant seeks a visa differ from those applicable when an 
applicant seeks citizenship, we see no reason why the test of 
materiality under Kungys would not apply in DPA eligibility 
cases.  Materiality, after all, refers to the effect of a 
representation on a decision maker regardless of the nature of 
the decision.  In other words, no matter what is being decided, 
the misrepresentation is material under Kungys if it has the 
natural tendency to affect the decision.  We see no reason not to 
apply that test here.  Thus, Kungys is doubly significant here, 
for it establishes that the resolution of materiality is a legal 
undertaking and it sets forth the test of what is material.   
         Inasmuch as under Kungys the materiality of a 
misrepresentation in a denaturalization proceeding is a matter of 
law, not fact, there cannot possibly be a need for the government 
to produce evidence from officials that if the truth had been 
told the officers would have reached a different result.  Kungys, 
485 U.S. at 772, 108 S.Ct. at 1547.  After all, evidence is not 
needed for a court to make a legal determination.  Thus, while 
the government frequently has produced evidence of that 
character, the effect of Kungys in 1988 has been to eliminate the 
need for such evidence, if it ever was required.    
         We do not go so far as to suggest that evidence of what 
a consular or DPC official would have done if given the correct 
information is not admissible because we have no need to reach 
that point.  Indeed, we even will assume that in a close case 
evidence of that character would be useful for the court in 
making a legal determination concerning the materiality of a 
misrepresentation.  After all, the Supreme Court, prior to Kungysin 
Fedorenko v. United States, quoted and relied on such evidence 
produced by the government, though it noted that it was proffered 
and accepted by the court "[w]ithout objection" from the 
defendant.  449 U.S. at 448-50, 101 S.Ct. at 743-44.  Yet, in 
Fedorenko the court did say that the defendant was ineligible for 
a visa "as a matter of law."  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509, 101 
S.Ct. at 749.   
         Though we thus acknowledge that in a close case 
evidence of whether or not the consular official's decision would 
have been different if he knew the truth might be helpful to the 
court in deciding a materiality issue, this case is not close.  
In our view, it cannot reasonably be argued that Stelmokas's 
misrepresentation that he was a laborer and a school teacher when 
in fact he was an officer in the Schutzmannschaft and served in 
the Luftwaffe could not have had a natural tendency to influence 
the DPC analyst and the vice-consul.  Indeed, probably without 
recognizing the implications of his statement, Stelmokas admits 
as much, for in his post-argument brief he describes his 
fabricated wartime employment as a "neutral" factor in the 
decision to admit him to the United States.  Br. at 3.  He hardly 
could contend that a revelation of his real Schutzmannschaft and 
Luftwaffe service would have amounted to the disclosure of a 
"neutral" factor. 
         We have no doubt that if Stelmokas had told the truth 
about his service on behalf of Germany during World War II he 
never would have obtained his visa for permanent residency in the 
United States, and he never would have been naturalized.  After 
all, we have found that these activities disqualified him from 
securing displaced person status and from obtaining a visa.  
Thus, the misrepresentations surely were material.  Of course, 
there is a certain irony in Stelmokas's contention that his 
misrepresentations were not material, because when he made them 
he must have recognized the need to hide the truth so that he 
could be admitted to this country.  At least we can discern no 
other motive that he might have had to conceal his wartime 
activities.  The truth is inescapable:  he invented his wartime 
history out of thin air so that he could be admitted to the 
United States and ultimately obtain citizenship. 
         We make an additional observation with respect to the 
custom of the government of calling consular or INS officials to 
testify that their decisions would have been different if they 
had known the truth.  As we have indicated, Stelmokas seems to 
believe that the materiality of a misrepresentation is a factual 
issue and reasons that the fact of materiality cannot be 
established without testimony as to what the consequence of the 
provision of truthful information to the decision maker would 
have been.  Yet, even treating materiality as a factual question, 
we see no reason why the district court as the trier of the fact 
could not conclude, without such testimony, that the 
misrepresentation had a natural tendency to affect the decision 
and thus was material.  We will not convert the government's 
custom in producing consular or INS testimony to establish the 
materiality of a misrepresentation into a requirement that it 
must do so, for we are not aware of any case which holds that the 
government must establish the materiality of a misrepresentation 
with testimony from a consular or INS officer that a truthful 
disclosure would have produced a different result.  
         We point out that our conclusion that evidence on 
materiality of a misrepresentation is not necessary is in harmony 
with our treatment of materiality in other contexts.  Bethel v. 
McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1996), is a recent 
example.  In Bethel, the plaintiff obtained a substantial verdict 
on a defamation claim.  Subsequently, the defendant moved for 
relief from the judgment entered on the verdict based on the 
plaintiff's testimony at an arbitration proceeding after the 
trial in the defamation case which was inconsistent with his 
earlier testimony at trial.  The district court granted relief 
and ordered a new trial on the defamation action.  The plaintiff 
appealed, and we affirmed.   
         Bethel is significant to this case because the district 
court and this court in Bethel were concerned with whether the 
"misrepresentation" was "material" to the plaintiff's case.  Id. 
at 385.  We held that it was not merely material, it was crucial.  
In entertaining the motion for relief from judgment, the district 
court developed a record establishing the misrepresentation by 
comparing the testimony at the trial and the arbitration.  But no 
witness testified that the misrepresentation was material.  
Rather, the district court, predicated on its own view of the 
record, concluded that it was material, and we reached the same 
conclusion using an identical methodology.  Thus, without citing 
Kungys, both courts in Bethel followed the Kungys formula of 
basing a determination of "the materiality of a statement . . . 
upon a factual evidentiary showing" and then making "an 
interpretation of substantive law."  Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772, 108 
S.Ct. at 1547 (omitting citation).  That procedure is exactly 
what the district court did here, and it is exactly what we do on 
this appeal.  In fact, materiality frequently is treated as a 
legal question, sometimes in a trial context as in Kungys, see In 
re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1995), and sometimes in 
other proceedings.  See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 
881, 886 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 714 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
 
 
                   E.  Comments on the dissent 
         We close the discussion portion of our opinion with  
comment on two aspects of Judge Aldisert's dissent, sections VII 
and VIII.  We do not address the rest of the dissent as our 
opinion adequately explains the bases for our conclusions and we 
do not regard the dissent as detracting from them.  We comment on 
his discussion in section VII of the dissent on Count IV of the 
complaint in which the government charged that Stelmokas 
illegally procured his naturalization because he misrepresented 
his wartime record to the DPC and to the vice-consul and thus was 
ineligible to enter the country.  We focus our attention on this 
point because Judge Aldisert includes in his dissent a concession 
which causes the dissent to self-destruct, namely  "that 
Stelmokas's failure to disclose his wartime military status would 
have had a natural tendency to influence immigration decisions."  
Dissent typescript at 29. 
         Initially on this point we reiterate that 8 U.S.C. § 
1451(a) provides in the disjunctive for a certificate of 
naturalization to be revoked if it was "illegally procured" or 
was "procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful 
misrepresentation."  In an "illegally procured" case, the alien 
obtains his naturalization illegally, in this case the illegality 
being that Stelmokas was not eligible for naturalization as he 
was not admissible into the United States.  In a "procured by" 
case, the alien obtains his naturalization by concealment of a 
material fact or by misrepresentation.  While Judge Aldisert 
asserts that the government attempted in Count IV to rely on the 
"procured by" language, in that count the references to 
Stelmokas's misrepresentations to the DPC analyst and the vice- 
counsel were germane only to the "illegally procured" component 
of section 1451(a).  Thus, Judge Aldisert's suggestion that Count 
IV of the complaint related in any way to the "procured by" 
language of section 1451(a) is simply not true.  Furthermore, 
while the government unsuccessfully did use Stelmokas's 
misrepresentations to the DPC analyst and the vice-consul in the 
only count of its complaint asserting a "procured by" charge, 
Count VII, the government does not pursue its case on that count 
on this appeal. 
         Judge Aldisert then indicates, quite correctly, that 
the government's case on Count IV begins with the major premises 
that DPA § 10, 62 Stat. 1013, barred from immigration any person 
who willfully misrepresented material facts to gain entry as a 
displaced person.  He then correctly indicates that the 
government argues that Stelmokas made material misrepresentations 
so that his entry was unlawful and he thus illegally procured his 
naturalization.  He then indicates that the "critical inquiry is 
whether the government met its important threshold burden of 
proving a misrepresentation as defined in the Displaced Persons 
Act."  Dissent typescript At 27.  (Emphasis added.) 
         The problem with the foregoing statement is inclusion 
of the word "threshold" for if the government established that 
Stelmokas made material misrepresentations to the DPC analyst and 
the vice-consul the case is over and the government wins.  Why is 
this so?  The answer is quite clear.  DPA § 10 provides that any 
"person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the 
purpose of gaining admission into the United States as an 
eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into 
the United States."  Of course, as we already have explained, 
that person is thus ineligible for naturalization.     
         Rather, as Judge Aldisert acknowledges, the test of 
materiality comes from Kungys, i.e., does the misrepresentation 
have a natural tendency to influence or was it capable of 
influencing the decision of the decision making body to which it 
was addressed?  While it appears that Judge Aldisert is reluctant 
to acknowledge that Stelmokas's lies to the DPC analyst and the 
vice-consul about his wartime activities were material, we 
reiterate that he does concede "that Stelmokas' failure to 
disclose his wartime military status would have had a natural 
tendency to influence immigration decisions."  Dissent typescript 
at 29.  Under Kungys the misrepresentations were therefore 
material without any showing of their effect on the DPC analyst 
or the vice-consul. 
         Notwithstanding the clear statutory scheme, Judge 
Aldisert either tries to add more elements to the definition of 
materiality or to demonstrate that the government had to show 
that the misrepresentations led to Stelmokas's admission into the 
country.  As we have indicated, the government has demonstrated 
the Stelmokas's misrepresentations led to his admission into the 
United States but it did not have to do so.  Nevertheless we 
address the point Judge Aldisert makes.  Judge Aldisert fails in 
this effort to demonstrate that the government had to demonstrate 
anything beyond the conceded fact that Stelmokas's 
misrepresentations had a natural tendency to influence the 
immigration decisions.  The reason he fails is that he relies on 
principles inapplicable in a case under the "illegally procured" 
clause of section 1451(a) when the case is predicated, as is this 
case in Count IV, on an alien having made a material 
misrepresentation under DPA § 10 for the purpose of gaining 
admission into the United States.  Thus, Judge Aldisert makes the 
following statement which is simply wrong in this "illegally 
procured" case under section 1451(a): "In denaturalization cases, 
equally important to establishing a material statement is the 
presentation of evidence that the misrepresentation procured the 
order and certificate of naturalization."  Dissent typescript at 
29.  The problem with the statement is that in "illegally 
procured" cases there is no requirement that a misrepresentation 
enabled the alien to procure anything.  Rather, in an illegally 
procured case dependent on a misrepresentation made when the 
alien sought admission into the United States, under DPA § 10 the 
government merely need prove that the misrepresentation for the 
purpose of obtaining admission into the United States was 
material.  Furthermore, Judge Aldisert's statement is wrong for 
the additional reason that Stelmokas did not make his 
misrepresentations to procure the order and certificate of 
naturalization.  He made them to obtain displaced person status 
and to be admitted into the United States. 
         We reiterate that Stelmokas's misrepresentations to the 
DPC analyst and the vice-consul are significant because under DPA 
§ 10 an alien who makes a material misrepresentation thereafter 
is not admissible into the United States.  Thus, if an alien who 
made a material misrepresentation is admitted and is naturalized, 
he has illegally procured his naturalization without regard for 
whether he procured anything by the misrepresentation.  We 
further emphasize that DPA § 10 in the clearest possible terms 
speaks prospectively, i.e., "thereafter" an alien making 
misrepresentations is not admissible into the United States.  
Accordingly, it is clear beyond doubt that once Stelmokas made 
his misrepresentations to the DPC analyst and the vice-consul, he 
was ineligible to enter the United States, because, in Judge 
Aldisert's words, his "failure to disclose his wartime military 
status would have had a natural tendency to influence immigration 
decisions."  Accordingly, Stelmokas could not be naturalized and 
he illegally procured his citizenship.  Nothing in DPA § 10 
requires that the alien procure his admission into the United 
States or anything else by his misrepresentations for even if the 
misrepresentations are uncovered immediately, so that the alien 
does not obtain displaced persons status or is not admitted to 
the United States, he is ineligible for admission to the United 
States after he makes his misrepresentations. 
         For reasons that must be driven by Judge Aldisert's 
sense that there is something unfair in the prosecution of this 
case he continues to develop his dissent along the same erroneous 
lines that we have described.  Thus, he points out that in Kungys"the 
government was obligated to demonstrate that Kungys' 
citizenship status was procured by his material 
misrepresentations."  Dissent typescript at 29.  He then 
inferentially acknowledges that Kungys was not an "illegally 
procured" case but was a case where the naturalization was 
"procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful 
misrepresentation," for he recites that the "Government seems to 
ask this court to apply different meanings to the term 'procured' 
in the two clauses of § 1451(a)."  Id. at 29-30.  He argues that 
"[t]here is no rational support for the suggestion that Congress 
intended such an anomalistic reading of the same word in the same 
section of the same statute.  There is absolutely no rational 
support for the notion that the government is not required to 
produce evidence showing precisely how Stelmokas was 'unlawfullyadmitted' 
and whether his naturalization was in fact 'illegally 
procured.'"  Id. at 30.  "If under the second clause in § 1451 
the government must show that the naturalization was 'procured 
by' the alleged misrepresentation, as the Court held in Kungys, 
then under the first clause certainly the government must 
demonstrate that Stelmokas was ineligible and therefore 
unlawfully admitted."  Id.       
         The problem with the foregoing quoted language from the 
dissent is obvious.  The government did demonstrate, in Judge 
Aldisert's words, that Stelmokas "was ineligible and therefore 
unlawfully admitted."  The government demonstrated that Stelmokas 
made a material misrepresentation under DPA § 10, which 
representation we once again point out did not have to result in 
Stelmokas procuring anything to violate that section.  Thus, 
Stelmokas illegally procured his naturalization.  Nothing could 
be clearer. 
         It is also clear that in the "illegally procured" and 
"procured by" clauses, "procured" has the same meaning and the 
government does not contend otherwise.  We repeat the distinction 
between the two types of cases.  In a "procured by" case the 
alien obtains his naturalization by his misrepresentation.  In an 
"illegally procured" case the alien obtains his naturalization 
illegally, in Stelmokas's case by entering the country when he 
could not be admitted.  Thus, "procured" means the same thing in 
"illegally procured" and "procured by" cases.  What differs is 
the interdicted conduct by which the alien procured his 
naturalization. 
         Of course, there is a good reason why the "procured by" 
clause in section 1451(a) requires that the government 
demonstrate more than that an alien made a material 
misrepresentation for naturalization to be revoked because, 
unlike DPA § 10 which applies prospectively so as to render an 
alien inadmissible to the United States, section 1451(a) always 
applies in a situation in which the alien already has procured 
his naturalization.  Thus, Judge Aldisert's emphasized quotation 
of Kungys that "the naturalized citizen must have procured 
citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment," 
485 U.S. at 767, 108 S.Ct. at 1544, dissent typescript at 31, 
does not support his position because there the Court was 
discussing a "procured by" not an "illegally procured" case.  
Judge Aldisert goes further in misusing the plain language of 
Kungys.  First, he correctly says that Kungys indicates that in a 
denaturalization proceeding there are "four independent 
requirements."  Dissent typescript at 31.  In fact, the Court 
said the following with respect to a "procured by" case under 
section 1451(a): 
         So understood, the provision plainly contains 
         four independent requirements:  the 
         naturalized citizen must have misrepresented 
         or concealed some fact, the misrepresentation 
         or concealment must have been willful, the 
         fact must have been material, and the 
         naturalized citizen must have procured 
         citizenship as a result of the 
         misrepresentation or concealment. 
 
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 767, 108 S.Ct. 1544-45.   
         Yet this language does not help Stelmokas for in the 
quotation the Court was not discussing an "illegally procured" 
case.  Rather, it set forth the elements of a "procured by" case.  
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the requirements were 
"independent."  Thus, it is impossible to read the statement in 
Kungys that the naturalized citizen have procured citizenship as 
a result of the misrepresentation into the materiality 
requirement of a misrepresentation under DPA § 10.  The 
materiality and procurement considerations are "independent" of 
each other and cannot be fused.  Furthermore, the requirement in 
a "procured by" case that the misrepresentation have resulted in 
the alien obtaining citizenship cannot be attached to the 
government's burden to show that Stelmokas's misrepresentations 
to obtain displaced person status and a visa in this "illegally 
procured" case were material.  Thus, Judge Aldisert's concession 
that Stelmokas's misrepresentations would have had a natural 
tendency to influence the immigration decisions should lead him 
to vote to affirm even if he rejects, as he does, the rest of the 
government's case, for as we explained above, if the government 
establishes that Stelmokas illegally procured his naturalization 
for a single reason we must affirm the district court.   
         Judge Aldisert discusses the possibility of the 
government producing evidence of what consular officials would 
have done if Stelmokas had not deceived them but we will not 
discuss this point as we have addressed it above.  Eventually he 
gets back to his central theme on Count IV but at that point he 
inexplicably compounds his errors for he says that "the 
government has not met its high burden of proof in this case 
because it failed to produce evidence that Stelmokas' 
misrepresentations procured the decision of the DPC analyst and 
the naturalization officials."  Dissent typescript at 38.  
(Emphasis added.)  Of course, the "naturalization officials" have 
nothing to do with this case on Count IV and thus the government 
does not contend that any misrepresentation to them is germane to 
that count.  Furthermore, the government did not have to show 
that Stelmokas's misrepresentations to the DPC analyst and the 
vice-consul procured the decision of the naturalization officials 
to grant naturalization as the misrepresentations were critical 
as they led to his admission into the United States. 
         The second aspect of Judge Aldisert's dissent on which 
we comment is part VIII in which he expresses due process and 
fairness concerns.  We point out that Stelmokas does not contend 
that the prosecution of the case has denied him due process of 
law.  Accordingly, this court should not be concerned with Judge 
Aldisert's observation that with the passage of time "witnesses 
disappear and memories fade."  Dissent typescript at 42.  In any 
event, lest too many tears be shed for Stelmokas, we point out 
that one witness has not disappeared and we have no reason to 
believe his memory has faded.  That witness, of course, is 
Stelmokas himself who with so much at stake persisted in his plea 
of the privilege against self-incrimination notwithstanding the 
order of the district court overruling the plea. 
 
 
                         III. CONCLUSION 
         After a careful examination of this matter, we have 
concluded that the district court made no errors of law and that 
the record fully supports and, in fact, compels the district 
court's conclusion that Stelmokas did not qualify for admission 
to this country as a displaced person.  Thus the district court 
correctly revoked his citizenship and ordered him to surrender 
his certificate of naturalization.  While many years have passed 
since his admission to the country and his obtaining of 
citizenship, it is not too late to remedy the wrong done when he 
was admitted.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of August 
2, 1995. 
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STAPLETON, J., Concurring: 
 
         I feel compelled to write separately because an 
accusation of personal participation in the atrocities of the 
Holocaust is a grave matter, and a judicial finding of such 
participation understandably carries with it extrajudicial, 
collateral consequences unrelated to citizenship and 
deportability.  While I agree with the court that the government 
has carried its burden on six counts of its complaint, I 
conclude that the evidence of Stelmokas' participation in the 
Grosse Aktion (Great Action) is not clear, convincing and 
unequivocal, and that the district court clearly erred in finding 
otherwise.   
         To be sure, there is substantial evidence that 
Stelmokas was a member of a platoon of the 3rd Company of the 3rd 
Battalion of the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft and was not on leave 
on the date of the Great Action.  Moreover, there is substantive 
evidence that Lithuanians in military uniforms aided the Germans 
in the mass execution.  It is a matter of speculation, however, 
whether all, some or none of Stelmokas' Schutzmannschaft 
Battalion participated. 
         On October 28-29, 1941, German troops, aided by 
"Lithuanian partisans," conducted an operation they referred to 
as the Great Action which resulted in the execution of 9,200 Jews 
from the ghetto in Vilijampole.  On the morning of October 28, 
the Jews were lined up by the Jewish Ghetto Police, and the 
Germans culled out those who were and were not fit to work.  
Those not fit to work were marched to the "small ghetto," which 
was adjacent to Vilijampole, and the next day they were marched, 
in groups of five hundred at a time, to Fort IX and executed.  
They were buried in mass graves dug by Soviet prisoners of war.  
Two survivors from Vilijampole testified that they saw 
Lithuanians in military uniforms aid the Germans in the Great 
Action, but they did not identify whether the men were from 
Stelmokas' Schutzmannschaft Battalion or from some other 
Lithuanian group. 
         No testimony and no documentary evidence directly links 
Stelmokas or the 3rd Battalion to the Great Action.  The district 
court, in finding participation by Stelmokas, relied largely on 
the opinion of Dr. Raul Hilberg that the entire 3rd Battalion 
must have participated in the Great Action.  Dr. Hilberg's 
opinion was based almost entirely on two observations.  First, he 
had "seen documents in which larger forces than one battalion 
were deployed to kill fewer than 10,000 people."  App. at 411. 
From this, he inferred that in addition to the personnel of the 
Einsatzkommando 3, the German unit of security police which 
carried out the operation, at least 500 men, a full battalion, 
were required for the Great Action.  He acknowledged, however, 
that the minimum number of men required would vary according to 
factors such as the terrain and the degree of resistance from the 
Jews.  Second, there was a "shortage of manpower" because German 
and Lithuanian units stationed near Kaunas had been sent to fight 
the Soviets.  Specifically, the majority of the German 11th 
Reserve Police Battalion and the entire 2d Lithuanian Battalion 
were in Byelorussia.  Putting these two observations together, 
Dr. Hilberg concluded that Stelmokas' entire Battalion must have 
assisted in the Great Action.  The balance of the 11th Reserve 
Police Battalion and the ghetto police would not, in his opinion, 
be sufficient in the absence of the entire 3rd Battalion of the 
Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft. 
         I do not question in the least Dr. Hilberg's 
qualifications as an expert in Holocaust history, nor do I doubt 
the conviction with which he believes Stelmokas participated in 
the Great Action.  Nevertheless, I cannot conclude that his 
observations, by themselves, clearly, convincingly and 
unequivocally demonstrate that Stelmokas aided the Germans in 
their massacre of October 28th and 29th.  Dr. Hilberg believed a 
full battalion was required based on the number of men used in 
mass executions elsewhere about which he had read.  He did not, 
however, describe the circumstances of the other mass executions 
and admitted that the minimum requirement would vary according to 
local conditions and the resistance level.  He did not identify 
any local conditions that would have made the Great Action a 
particularly labor intensive operation and candidly acknowledged, 
based on contemporary documentation, that no Jewish resistance 
was anticipated.  He also testified that it was reasonable to 
assume that some segment of the available manpower would have to 
have been assigned to the responsibilities that occupied the 
available troops on a day to day basis, e.g., protection of 
facilities and communication and the maintenance of security.  
Given the uncertainty involved in estimating manpower needs based 
on other, perhaps dissimilar, situations and the reasonable 
assumption that there were competing manpower demands in the 
local area, it seems speculative to assert that the entire 3rd 
Battalion participated despite the presence of a portion of the 
11th Reserve Police Battalion and the ghetto police. 
         My concern, however, is not grounded solely in the 
sufficiency of Dr. Hilberg's testimony; as Stelmokas points out, 
the government's own evidence casts serious doubt on the 
inferences drawn by Dr. Hilberg.  Certain documents suggest that 
a sizable contingent of Lithuanians not associated with the 
Sonderkommando was available to help in the Great Action, and 
that less than a full battalion of support troops may have been 
needed.  To make my point, a little background regarding the 
organization of German police forces is helpful. 
         Following the occupation of Lithuania by the German 
Army, German occupation police moved in and kept order.  One 
component of the German occupation police was the security 
police; the other component was the order police.  The security 
police had mobile units called Einsatzgruppen, about the size of 
a battalion, and these were broken down into companies called 
Einsatzkommando and Sonderkommando.  The Einsatzgruppen were in 
charge of exterminating Jews and other "undesirable" elements of 
the population.  Einsatzgruppen A was assigned to Lithuania and 
other Baltic states, and its subdivision Einsatzkommando 3, 
commanded by Colonel Jaeger, operated in the area including 
Kaunas.  The order police were much larger than the security 
police, and included the 11th Reserve Police Battalion mentioned 
by Dr. Hilberg.   
         A government exhibit indicates that in addition to 
Einsatzkommando 3, a sizable contingent of Sonderkommando was 
available in the Kaunas area.  This exhibit, entitled "USSR 
Situation Report No. 19" and dated July 11, 1941, was prepared 
for the Chief of Security Police and has a section devoted to the 
situation in Kaunas.  In this section, the report states that "We 
have retained approximately 205 Lithuanian partisans as a 
Sonderkommando, sustained them and deployed them for executions 
as necessary even outside the area."  App. at 1861.  The 
availability of nearly a half-battalion of Sonderkommando 
substantially undermines the conclusion that the entire 3rd 
Battalion of the Schutzmannschaft was necessary to carry out the 
Great Action.   
         In addition to this Situation Report No. 19, there is 
another contemporaneously prepared document that calls Dr. 
Hilberg's opinion into question.  As I have noted, Colonel Jaeger 
commanded the Einsatzkommando 3, the unit of German security 
police assigned to the Kaunas area.  Colonel Jaeger prepared a 
report, the Jaeger Report, which is dated December 10, 1941, and 
which refers to the Great Action and many other executions of 
Jews.  Colonel Jaeger there wrote the following chilling lines: 
              The goal to make Lithuania "Jew free" 
         could only be attained through the formation 
         of a mobile detachment with specially 
         selected men under the leadership of SS 
         Obersturmfuhrer Hamann who shared my goals 
         completely and who would guarantee the 
         cooperation of the Lithuanian partisans and 
         the existing civil offices. 
 
              The carrying-out of such actions is, in 
         the first place, a question of organization. 
         . . .  The Jews had to be collected in one or 
         in several locations.  Based on the numbers 
         [of Jews] a place for the necessary pits had 
         to be found and dug up. . . .  The Jews were 
         transported to the execution site in groups 
         of 500 and in intervals of at least 2 km.  
         What difficulties and nerve-racking work that 
         had to be accomplished is shown in the 
         following random example: 
 
              In Rokiskis, 3,208 people were to be 
         transported 4 1/2 km  before they could be 
         liquidated.  In order to accomplish this work 
         in 24 hours, 60 of the 80 available 
         Lithuanian partisans had to be detailed for 
         transport duty and perimeter security.  The 
         remainder, who had to be repeatedly relieved, 
         carried out the work with my men. . . .  
         Attempts to escape that happened here and 
         there were prevented entirely by my men and 
         with some danger to their lives. . . .  Only 
         through skillful use of time was it possible 
         to carry out up to 5 actions in a week's time 
         and to handle the work that had accumulated 
         in Kaunas so that no bottlenecks occurred in 
         the official functions. 
 
              The actions in Kaunas itself, where 
         there were sufficient reasonably well-trained 
         partisans available, were virtually duck 
         shoots compared with the enormous 
         difficulties which were often encountered 
         elsewhere. 
 
              All leaders and men in my detachment in 
         Kaunas took an active part in the major 
         actions in Kaunas. 
         . . . 
App. 1133-34.   
         Colonel Jaeger reports the executions of thousands of 
Jews and hundreds of others in such an impersonal, matter-of-fact 
manner and with such pride that his account leaves one in a 
horror-driven state of shock.  Nevertheless, the Jaeger Report, 
as documentary evidence, is important in the present context for 
a number of reasons.  First, in the context of a somewhat smaller 
but nevertheless substantial mass execution, it provides a 
contemporary estimate of the manpower necessary to perform the 
grizzly task of mass execution from a German official having 
responsibility for carrying out those executions.  The report 
indicates that the mass execution of 3,208 people at Rokiskis was 
carried out by Einsatzkommando 3 personnel with the assistance of 
only 80 "Lithuanian partisans."   
         Second, while Rokiskis provides an example of a mass 
execution with "enormous difficulties," the execution of "2007 
Jews, 2,920 Jewesses, and 4,273 Jewish children" in the course of 
the Great Action did not present comparable problems.  App. at 
1129. 
         Putting these two pieces of evidence together, even if 
one assumes that the number of potential victims in the Great 
Action would require substantially more support from "Lithuanian 
partisans" than was employed in Rokiskis, Dr. Hilberg's 
insistence that a minimum of 500, in addition to the 
Einsatzkommando 3 personnel, seems questionable, at least in the 
absence of more explanation than he was able to give. 
         Finally, the Lithuanian partisans who in fact 
participated in the Great Action are described as "reasonably 
well trained."  When one puts this together with the U.S.S.R. 
Special Report 19's indication that approximately 205 Lithuanian 
partisans had been formed into a Sonderkommando company 
specifically to be "deployed . . . for executions as necessary," 
the most likely inference is that at least a large segment of the 
need for Lithuanian participants during the Great Action were met 
by Lithuanians who were not from the Schutzmannschaft 3rd 
Battalion.  In suggesting that this is the likely inference, I am 
not unmindful of Dr. Hilberg's opinion that the reference to 
"reasonably well trained partisans" in the Jaeger Report meant 
Schutzmannschaft personnel.  The basis for that opinion, in its 
entirety, is found in the following excerpt from his testimony: 
              In this report, Jaeger is trying to 
         impress his superiors.  That's a very common 
         phenomenon in reporting.  And so he, first of 
         all, calls attention to the difficulties and 
         complexities of organizing such an operation.  
         He refers to thorough preparation of each 
         individual action and knowledge of the 
         conditions in the area in question. . . . 
 
              He then goes into some examples of towns 
         and then, referring on top of page 30 of the 
         English translation, he says that the actions 
         encompass itself a little bit easier because 
         there were well trained partisans, as he 
         calls them.  Now what he is referring to, of 
         course, is the schutzmannschaft.  And the 
         reference to the training can be explained by 
         the fact that right from the start [of the 
         schutzmannschaft], June 28th, 1941, the call 
         went out for volunteers who had military 
         experience.  In other words, these people 
         knew how to fire a weapon, they knew how to 
         hit their target.  And for that reason, the 
         operation was, in his view, like shooting at 
         a parade.  It was well coordinated and well 
         done. 
 
App. at 277, 277-78.  Dr. Hilberg's inference is a plausible one.  
However, once one is aware that a group of Lithuanian partisans 
had been formed and were available specifically for this purpose, 
I believe another inference becomes the more plausible one.   
         I acknowledge that the inferences I suggest based on 
the Jaeger Report and Special Report No. 19 do not constitute 
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that Stelmokas did 
notparticipate in the Great Action.  He may well have participated.  
It was the government's burden, however, to produce clear, 
convincing, and unequivocal evidence that Stelmokas didparticipate.  In my 
view, it did not come anywhere close to 
carrying that burden. 
         While the district court reached its conclusion about 
Stelmokas's participation in the Great Action without reference 
to his failure to testify at the trial, it noted that it believed 
an inference could appropriately be drawn from that failure which 
confirmed its conclusion.  I agree with the district court that 
the Fifth Amendment did not foreclose it from drawing a negative 
inference from Stelmokas's failure to explain what he was doing 
on October 28 and 29, 1941.  As the Supreme Court cautioned in 
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976), however, a 
party's silence should not be given "more evidentiary value than 
[is] warranted by the facts surrounding [the] case."  Here, 
Stelmokas stands accused of a number of different forms of 
conduct, any one of which would warrant the revocation of his 
citizenship.  If Stelmokas had taken the stand and denied 
participation in the Great Action, he would have subjected 
himself to cross-examination that almost certainly would have 
established another ground for revocation.  Under these 
circumstances, I do not believe any appropriate, negative 
inference from silence can boost Dr. Hilberg's speculative 
opinion into the realm of clear, convincing and unequivocal 
evidence. 
         Finally, I turn to the dissent's conclusion that there 
is insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding 
regarding Stelmokas's guarding of the Vilijampole ghetto.  In 
contrast to the state of the record regarding Stelmokas's 
participation in the Great Action, I find the evidence supporting 
this finding to be clear, convincing, and unequivocal. 
         The finding at issue reads as follows: 
              The Court finds that the Government has 
         not established by clear, unequivocal, and 
         convincing evidence that the shootings on 
         September 16-17, 1941 were carried out by 
         either the defendant or Schutzmannschaft 
         members under his command.  However, the 
         Government has established by clear, 
         unequivocal, and convincing evidence that 
         defendant was commander of the ghetto guard 
         for a 24-hour period commencing September 16, 
         1941, at 1 p.m., that Jews in the ghetto were 
         subject to extreme deprivation, brutality, 
         and arbitrary shootings during that period, 
         and that defendant was responsible for 
         enforcing the confinement of Jews in such 
         conditions. 
 
         On September 1, 1941, Stelmokas's Battalion Commander 
entered the following order: 
          TO THE 3rd AUXILIARY POLICE SERVICE BATTALION 
                      Order Number 1, Secret 
                     Kaunas, 1 September 1941 
                        Operations Section 
                               § 1. 
 
         I announce the Battalion's schedule of guard 
deployments and positions: 
 
 
 
Guard Post 
Number 
Guard 
duties 
Guard place 
of 
assignment 
Number on 
Duty 
Purpose 
 
 
  3 
Guard at 
the 
captured 
ammunition 
warehouse 
Vilijampole, 
VIII Fort 
  4 
To guard 
the    
ammunition 
warehouse 
 
 
  21 
"Ghetto 
guard" 
Vilijampole, 
Veliuonos 
street   
17 
  32 
Not to let 
a single 
Jew out of 
the closed 
quarter 
 
 
          Two weeks later, on September 15, 1941, the same 
Battalion Commander entered another order, section 1 of which 
made the following duty assignments: 
         Security and service duties for 16 September 
         of the current year: 
 
         Battalion Duty Officer Junior Lieutenant 
         TAMULAITIS, VYTAUTAS 
 
         Assistant to the Duty Officer -  Corporal 
         KVARACIEJUS 
 
         Duty Clerk at the Battalion Headquarters - 
         Corporate AUKSORAITIS 
 
         Guard Commander in Vilijampole - Junior 
         Lieutenant STELMOKAS 
          
         Guards from the 3rd Company 
 
While this order was lengthy and dealt with a variety of 
subjects, these were the only current duty assignments recorded. 
         The record discloses that the ghetto was located in a 
section of the city called "Vilijampole" and that "Vilijampole" 
was frequently used as a synonym for the ghetto.  As Stelmokas 
stresses, the record also indicated, however, that Fort VIII, 
while in the area called Vilijampole, was not in the ghetto.  
Based on this evidence, Stelmokas suggests that the order 
assigning him as "Guard Commander in Vilijampole" is ambiguous -- 
that the assignment might have been merely to guard ammunition at 
Fort VIII. 
         While I agree with Stelmokas that the government had 
the burden of proving Stelmokas's participation in the 
persecution of Jews by clear, convincing and unequivocal 
evidence, his suggestion of a significant ambiguity in the record 
is unpersuasive.  Dr. Hilberg and the September 1st order itself 
indicate that in the context of guard duty, the words "Fort VIII" 
was generally included in the designation of that guard post in 
order to distinguish duty there from the duty of guarding the 
ghetto.  More importantly, Stelmokas commanded a platoon 
consisting of something over 30 men and it is far more likely 
that he was given responsibility for Guard Post 21 or both Guard 
Posts 21 and 3, than that he commanded only the four guards at 
Fort VIII.  Finally, and most importantly, the September 15th 
order reports only two command assignments:  the "Battalion Duty 
Officer" and the "Guard Commander at Vilijampole."  The 
suggestion that this order would record the identity of the 
commander of a four man unit at Fort VIII and omit entirely any 
mention of the Guard Commander of the ghetto strikes me as too 
far fetched to raise even a reasonable doubt.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States v. Jonas Stelmokas, No. 95-1894 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
    Again we are faced with a denaturalization proceeding 
brought by the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) against an 
American octogenarian for events that took place during the Nazi 
occupation of Europe more than 50 years ago.  Although stripping 
an American of his citizenship is a civil proceeding, the effect 
is so drastic that the government's burden is "substantially 
identical with that required in criminal cases--proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 
611-612 (1949). 
    The predicate acts that form the basis of OSI prosecutions 
take place in the midst of what must be acknowledged to be the 
most craven and pusillanimous crime ever sponsored by a nation-- 
the Holocaust effectuated by the German Third Reich in the 1930s 
and 1940s.  This case is no exception.   
    The inhuman Nazi brutality that underlies these cases makes 
especially arduous our obligation to require the government's 
high burden of proof, but the law commands that we do just that, 
and rightly so.  Indeed, faced with a backdrop of such monstrous 
and inhuman past behavior, a court's responsibility in 1996 to 
insure the maximum protection of the law constitutes America's 
best response to the Nazi juggernaut that crushed all semblance 
of justice and freedom, and millions of innocent lives a half 
century ago. 
    The district court revoked the citizenship of Jonas 
Stelmokas because he joined and served in the Lithuanian 3rd 
Auxiliary Police Service Battalion in 1941.  At the time, he was 
a 25-year-old junior lieutenant.  The court ruled in favor of the 
government on six separate, but related counts.  It determined 
that Stelmokas: voluntarily assisted the enemy in persecuting 
civil populations, particularly on September 16, 1941 and October 
28-29, 1941 (Count I); voluntarily assisted German forces in 
military operations against the United States and its allies 
(Count II); voluntarily joined and participated in a movement 
hostile to the United States (Count III); advocated or acquiesced 
in conduct contrary to civilization and human decency (Count V); 
lacked good moral character by virtue of his Schutzmannschaftmembership 
(Count VI); and willfully misrepresented material 
facts in his application for admission to the United States as a 
displaced person (Count IV).  I would reverse the district 
court's determination on each count.  Accordingly I dissent.  
          What we as U.S. Circuit judges know as men and women 
requires us to despise the loathsome conduct of the Nazis in 
World War II.  Knowledge of the Third Reich's intentional 
brutalization and annihilation of innocent civilians is ingrained 
in our senses as a revulsion of the worst genocide of the modern 
era, if not of all time.  Our role as appellate judges, however, 
is not to proclaim our visceral reactions to the horrors of 
history. Rather, we must confine ourselves to the trial record in 
this case and decide, as a dispassionate reviewing court, whether 
the OSI has proved by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt" that Stelmokas 
in fact committed the alleged acts and that such conduct supports 
a denaturalization proceeding.  Schneiderman v. United States, 
320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943).  This the OSI has not done.   
         The OSI's case against Stelmokas does not rest on direct 
evidence but solely on a series of rickety inferences that do not 
rise to the high level of proof demanded of the government.  To 
this unimpressive framework has been added what the district 
court describes as adverse inferences drawn from Stelmokas' 
decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege to refrain 
from testifying at trial.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at 47.  The Supreme 
Court has established that a defendant's Fifth Amendment plea in 
a denaturalization case constitutes the basis for adverse 
inferences only to the extent those inferences are supported by 
"substantial evidence manifested in the record."  Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976).  The OSI's case against 
Stelmokas lacks such substantial evidence and is hobbled by 
several fundamental weaknesses, which together are fatal to the 
OSI's attempt to meet the unusually high burden of proof 
required. 
         First, the OSI has been unable to present even one eye- 
witness to support its charges.  Second, the OSI failed to 
present any direct evidence or any legitimate circumstantial 
evidence of participation in proscribed activity that would, as 
required, logically and unerringly support an incriminating 
inference.  Instead, the OSI relied on as many as five layers of 
inference to conclude that: (1) that Stelmokas was responsible 
for confining Jews in the Kaunas, Lithuania ghetto when two Jews 
were shot on September 17, 1941 and (2) he participated in the 
massacre of thousands of Jews in the Grosse Aktion at the same 
location on October 28-29, 1941.  Third, the OSI supported its 
allegations by introducing undated documents, without 
accompanying testimony as to their relevance and effect on 
immigration officials at the relevant times.  Fourth, and 
especially fatal to its case, the OSI failed to present testimony 
from Displaced Persons Commission personnel or consular 
officials--as it has in all similar cases--that Stelmokas' non- 
disclosure of his 3rd Battalion service in fact impacted or would 
have impacted the immigration officials' decision-making process 
and rendered him ineligible for a visa.  For these reasons, I 
would reverse the district court's judgment of denaturalization. 
 
                                I. 
         Before analyzing the specific legal questions presented 
here, I must describe conditions in Europe, and particularly in 
the displaced-persons camps, at the time Stelmokas applied for 
his visa in July, 1949.  I start with V-E Day, May 8, 1945.  
Notwithstanding the presence of European nation-states, the power 
to rearrange the map of Europe had passed to the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  Although Hitler's Reich had come to an 
end, at its peak the Nazi empire had stretched from the French 
port of Brest to the Caucasus and from the tip of Norway to the 
border of Egypt.  As part of its rampage, the Nazi war machine 
smashed into Lithuania on June 22, 1941; three days later it 
occupied Kaunas, what was then the Lithuanian capital.   
         By the end of the six-year struggle to bring down the Nazi 
empire, an estimated 40 million Europeans had lost their lives-- 
in combat, under the bombs that obliterated cities, through 
Hitler's methodical genocide, or simply from hunger, cold and 
disease.  At the end of the war, the state of Germany had ceased 
to exist.  An innumerable mass of civilians, freed prisoners and 
the first waves of 13 million refugees from Eastern Europe 
wandered the country.  Nearly eight million Germans were 
homeless.  People bartered household necessities for food and 
clothing, often subsisting on little more than 1,000 calories a 
day. 
         The onset of a chill between the Soviets and the Western 
allies sealed the division of the country between two hostile 
occupation zones.  By 1947 it was becoming clear that Stalin had 
no intention of fulfilling his promise, made to Roosevelt and 
Churchill at Yalta, to hold free elections in Poland.  Where the 
Red Army stood, Soviet power reigned, straining westward.  A 
Communist insurgency, supported from bases in Bulgaria, Albania 
and Yugoslavia, threatened the vulnerable British-backed monarchy 
in Greece.  Soviet pressure mounted against Turkey for control of 
the Black Sea straits. 
         Such was the political climate surrounding the displaced- 
persons camps when Stelmokas applied for his visa in 1949 at 
Hamburg, Germany.  Refugees were caught in a vicious political 
struggle between the two superpowers.  With American and Soviet 
diplomatic armies posturing eyeball-to-eyeball, the de factodivision of 
Germany already had taken place.  The die having been 
cast in both the west and the east by the occupying armies, 
Central Europe remained the primary political battleground for 
almost a decade after V-E Day.   
         It is against this complex and volatile political background 
that I consider the legal issues arising from Stelmokas' visa 
application.  Indeed, the facts underlying the legal issues must 
be viewed as they existed in the harsh environment of a battered 
and shattered post-war Europe, not as they might be viewed from 
the cozy environment of a 1996 federal courtroom.   
         I agree with the government that the wartime Lithuanian and 
German documents generated in Lithuania and obtained by the OSI 
from archives are admissible.  However, I question whether these 
documents alone are sufficient to support the government's high 
burden of proof.      
 
                               II. 
         I turn first to Count I, the linchpin of the government's 
entire case against Stelmokas.  In Count I the government alleges 
that Stelmokas voluntarily assisted the Nazis in persecuting 
civilian populations.  The OSI anchors this contention on the 
events of September 16-17, 1941 and October 28-29, 1941.  
                    A.  September 16-17, 1941  
         I accept that Order #10 of the 3rd Auxiliary Police Service 
Battalion, dated September 15, 1941, indicates that "Junior 
Lieutenant STELMOKAS" was detailed as "Guard Commander in 
Vilijampole."  A1316.  From this, and from evidence that two Jews 
were killed in the Kaunas ghetto between September 16 and 17, 
1941, the district court reached the following conclusion: 
         The Court finds that the Government has not established 
         by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the 
         shootings on September 16-17, 1941 were carried out by 
         either the defendant or Schutzmannschaft members under 
         his command.  However, the Government has established 
         by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that 
         defendant was commander of the ghetto guard for a 24- 
         hour period commencing September 16, 1941, at 1 p.m., 
         that Jews in the ghetto were subject to extreme 
         deprivation, brutality, and arbitrary shootings during 
         that period, and that defendant was responsible for 
         enforcing the confinement of Jews in such conditions.   
 
F.F.60 
 
         A conclusory inference predicated on a clear and narrowly 
established fact might have been sufficient to inculpate 
Stelmokas.  However, an inference teased from a series of other 
inferences may not substitute for hard evidence where the 
government's burden is so high.  And that is the extent of the 
government's case and that is also why the district court found 
that "the government has not established by clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing evidence that the shootings on September 16-17, 
1941 were carried out by either the defendant or Schutzmannschaftmembers 
under his command." F.F. 60.  The district court went 
further, however, and concluded that Stelmokas was commander of 
the ghetto guard and enforced confinement of Jews in horrible 
conditions.  Because the government did not meet its high burden 
of proving these aspects of its allegations, the district court 
erred. 
                                 
                               1. 
         Unlike virtually every other case prosecuted by the Office 
of Special Investigations, here no direct evidence shows that 
Stelmokas confined Jews to the ghetto during the days in 
question.  Indeed, the direct evidence presented in this case is 
limited to the following: That deployed in the Kaunas, Lithuania 
area were at least two Lithuanian army units under the control of 
the Nazis--the 3rd Auxiliary Police Service Battalion (also 
described hereafter as Schutzmannschaft), in which Stelmokas was 
an officer, and a Sonderkommando company of approximately 205 
Lithuanian partisans, in which Stelmokas was not a member; that 
Stelmokas was listed as "Guard Commander in Vilijampole" of the 
3rd Battalion; that shootings of Jews in the ghetto by Nazis and 
Lithuanians frequently occurred; and that two Jews were killed 
in the ghetto on September 17.   
    It is uncontradicted that "Vilijampole" was a neighborhood 
containing not only the ghetto, but also surrounding areas 
including Fort VIII, which was situated 100 meters or more from 
one border of the ghetto.  It bears repeating that although 
Stelmokas is accused of commanding the Vilijampole guard on this 
day, there is no direct proof that he commanded the ghetto guard 
and was responsible for enforcing the confinement of Jews in the 
ghetto.  We are left to infer that a single written order that 
Stelmokas was "Guard Commander in Vilijampole" demonstrates that 
the 3rd Battalion, and not the Sonderkommando company, was the 
ghetto guard on this day.  We are left to speculate whether the 
3rd Battalion was not merely assigned to guard adjacent areas, 
including bridges, warehouses, ammunition depots etc.  A518-A519. 
The evidence leaves unanswered the question of whether the unit 
patrolled parts of the Vilijampole neighborhood that did not 
include the ghetto--an area that also encompassed non-Jewish 
residences, businesses and an ammunition warehouse--the ghetto 
itself, or both.  To repeat, there was no direct evidence 
supporting the district court's determination and the quality of 
circumstantial evidence was so inferior that it did not satisfy 
the government's high burden of proof. 
    No evidence supported the district court's conclusion other 
than the fact that Stelmokas was assigned as "Guard commander of 
Vilijampole" at the time two Jews were killed in the ghetto.  No 
evidence, beyond his assignment, indicated that he in fact served 
with, or commanded, the ghetto guard.  No evidence demonstrated 
that Stelmokas engaged in the conduct or duties the district 
court attributed to ghetto guards generally.  F.F. 49-60. 
 
                               2. 
    Alternatively, even if there was sufficient evidence to show 
that Stelmokas served with the ghetto guard, the district court 
failed to heed the teaching of Fedorenko v. United States, 449 
U.S. 490, 512 n. 34 (1981) ("The solution to the problem...lies, 
not in 'interpreting' the Act to include a voluntariness 
requirement that the statute itself does not impose, but in 
focusing on whether the particular conduct can be considered 
assisting the persecution of civilians.  Thus, an individual who 
did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were 
executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of 
civilians.").  The cases that interpret Fedorenko in the context 
of Nazi occupations, for the most part, emphasize the distinction 
between active and passive collaboration with the Nazis.  Of 
necessity, each case is fact specific and turns on the particular 
evidence in the case.  In United States v. Koreh, 59 F.3d 431 (3d 
Cir. 1995), for example, we concluded that the defendant who had 
served as editor of pro-Nazi newspapers containing many anti- 
Semitic articles assisted in the persecution of Hungarian Jews 
through his activities.  In United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 
115 (2d Cir. 1985), a case dealing with military or constabulary 
activity under Nazi direction, with facts more onerous than those 
in the case at bar, affirmed the denial of the denaturalization 
complaint brought by OSI.  
    The court in Sprogis emphasized the difference between 
active participation in hostile acts against civilians and 
passive accommodation of the Nazis.  The defendant Sprogis 
admittedly served as a member of the local Latvian police, 
sometimes used by Nazis "to locate, arrest, guard, transport or 
execute Jews, and to confiscate their property."  Id. at 117.  
Sprogis testified that he voluntarily joined the police force.  
Sprogis was Assistant Precinct Chief and eventually Police Chief. 
Id. at 118.  Sprogis conceded he signed and prepared certain 
documents admitted into evidence demonstrating that he paid 
farmers to transport Jews to camps for confinement and 
persecution, of which he was aware. Id.  He testified he was "the 
highest ranking officer" present at a police station where nine 
Jews were "forcibly detained."  He conceded, and later 
contradicted his concession, that he "ordered other policemen to 
guard the prisoners."  Id. at 119.  Sprogis was in Litene on the 
day 200 Jews were executed en masse and contended he was there at 
the insistence of the district police chief and "only to witness, 
on behalf of the police," the execution of a photographer.  
Sprogis testified that as he was leaving Litene he saw 100 to 150 
prisoners marching toward the camp where the photographer had 
been executed.  Testimony by other witnesses indicated that 
"Sprogis, at the direction of the Nazis, ordered the arrest of 
all Jews in the area. . . . that the [police force of which he 
was a part], including Sprogis, participated in transporting and 
guarding approximately 200 Jews just prior to their execution . . 
. ."  Id. at 120.   
     As in the case at bar, in Sprogis the government sought 
denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1451(a) and 1427, with 
allegations grounded in § 10 of the Displaced Persons Act 
("DPA").  The government claimed Sprogis' citizenship was 
"illegally procured" because he failed to disclose in his 
immigration papers that he assisted in persecuting Soviet 
prisoners of war, Jews and other civilians while a Latvian police 
officer.  The government also asserted that his citizenship was 
procured through misrepresentations concerning his participation 
in persecution.   
    Confronted with such evidence, the court affirmed the 
district court's conclusion and stated: 
          to prevail under any of its theories, the 
          government had to show that Sprogis assisted in 
          the persecution of Jews or other civilians and 
          that the government had not satisfied its 
          substantial burden of proving that assistance by 
          'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence 
          which does 'not leave the issue in doubt.' 
      
Sprogis, 763 F.2d at 120 (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 
U.S. 490, 505 (1981), and quoting Schneiderman v. United States, 
320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943)).  The court reiterated the district 
court's finding of "no credible evidence that Sprogis personally 
arrested or ordered the arrest of a Jew or walked the streets . . 
. with the demeanor of a uniformed or armed conqueror . . . he 
performed the duties of an ordinary police officer." Sprogis, 763 
F.2d at 120-21.  The court stated: 
          Finally, he was present at the police station during the 
          detention of the prisoners and he allowed their 
          incarceration to continue. However, these were not acts of 
          oppression.  They do not amount to the kind of active 
          assistance in persecution which the DPA condemns. 
      
Id. at 122, (citing Laipenieks v. I.N.S. 750 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (assistance in persecution under 8 U.S.C. § 
1251(a)(19), a companion statute to the DPA, requires "proof of 
personal active assistance or participation in persecutorial 
acts")). 
    The court of appeals further noted that in each of even the 
less-than-clear cases of assistance in persecution, "the 
individual condemned as a persecutor had actively participated in 
some act of oppression directed against persecuted civilians."  
Id. at 122.  The court went on to acknowledge Sprogis' passive 
accommodation of the Nazis, but stated, 
          There is no clear evidence that he made any 
          decision to single out any person for arrest and 
          persecution or that he committed any hostile act 
          against any persecuted civilian. Sprogis' passive 
          accommodation of the Nazis, like that of so many 
          other civil servants similarly faced with the 
          Nazis' conquest of their homelands and the horrors 
          of World War II, does not, in our view, exclude 
          him from citizenship under the DPA. 
           
     Id. 
 
    The district court's conclusion that the government 
established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that 
defendant was commander of the ghetto guard during the relevant 
period and thereby responsible for enforcing confinement of Jews 
is based only upon the fact that he was "assigned" as "Guard 
Commander in Vilijampole."  Even if such a conclusion were 
supported by the evidence, and I do not believe it was, it would 
be insufficient grounds on which to denaturalize a citizen under 
the reasoning of Sprogis.  Accordingly, the evidence regarding 
Stelmokas' conduct on September 17, 1942 was not sufficient to 
sustain the district court's conclusion in Count I. 
 
                       B. October 28, 1941 
    During the Grosse Aktion of October 28-29, 1941, more than 
9,000 Jews were massacred in Kaunas, Lithuania.  The OSI contends 
that Stelmokas participated in this slaughter, again on the basis 
of very limited direct evidence.  The only direct evidence is 
that two witnesses stated in 1994, drawing upon their childhood 
memories 54 years past when they were 12 and 14 years of age, 
that they recall seeing men in Lithuanian army uniforms 
participating in the massacre.  The record indicates that these 
Lithuanian soldiers could have been members of either the 
Sonderkommando company or the 3rd Battalion.  No evidence 
confirms that these Lithuanian soldiers were members of the 3rd 
Battalion, of which Stelmokas was a member, or that he 
participated in any massacre.  Yet because a large number of Jews 
was involved, Dr. Raul Hilberg, the OSI's expert witness, 
concluded that the Nazis must have needed help to do their 
killing and that Stelmokas must have participated in the 
massacre.  In so doing, Dr. Hilberg pieces together a rather 
tenuous inferential chain: 
     Facts: Thousands of Jews were slaughtered in the ghetto on 
October 28, 1941; two eye-witnesses testified 54 years later that 
soldiers wearing Lithuanian uniforms participated.  Such soldiers 
could have been members of the Sonderkommando or the 
Schutzmannschaft. 
     First Inference: Because many Jews were killed on that 
date, the Nazi occupiers must have had insufficient numbers to 
conduct the operation themselves. 
     Second Inference: Being unable to conduct the operation 
themselves, the Nazis must have ordered Lithuanian uniformed 
soldiers to assist. 
     Third Inference: Because the Nazis had to enlist such help, 
and because two eye-witnesses testified that they saw men in 
Lithuanian uniforms, the 3rd Battalion must have been one of the 
two Lithuanian army units commanded by the Nazis to assist. This 
is either a non sequitur or an invalid disjunctive syllogism.   
     Fourth Inference: Because the Nazis had to enlist the 3rd 
Battalion, all battalion officers must have participated. 
     Fifth Inference: Assuming that the 3rd Battalion was the 
group ordered by the Nazis to assist (Inference Three), and that 
officers in that battalion participated (Inference Four), then 
Stelmokas, as an officer, must have participated. 
    The ultimate inference urged by the OSI is that Stelmokas 
participated in the Grosse Aktion.  For an inference to be 
legitimate, as set forth in note 3 ante, the reasoning upon which 
it rests must pass from some evidentiary fact (the datum) to a 
conclusion related in some way to that evidentiary fact and 
accepted only because that fact has been established.  Here, 
however, the conclusion (Stelmokas participated) is not directly 
related to the datum (many Jews were killed by soldiers and some 
soldiers wore Lithuanian army uniforms).  Instead, the conclusion 
requires that one meander through four other inferences to reach 
the datum.  One cannot make this stretch in the law, piling 
inference on inference on inference, and still meet the high 
burden of "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence which does 
not leave the issue in doubt."   
    That men in Lithuanian uniforms were allegedly present 
simply cannot support the bold conclusion that these men must 
have been members of the 3rd Battalion, let alone that one of 
these men must have been Stelmokas.  The men in Lithuanian 
uniforms very well could have been members of the Sonderkommando  
company.  A comparable chain of quintuple inferences such as that 
relied upon by the government and district court in this case, 
could not, as a matter of law, support a charge of shoplifting, 
let alone bolster the revocation of a petitioner's citizenship--a 
punishment tantamount to exile or banishment.  Accordingly, I 
agree with Judge Stapleton and I accept his analysis in the 
concurring opinion that the government did not meet its high 
burden of proof that Appellant participated in the Grosse Aktion 
of October 28-29, 1941. 
         For the reasons presented above, I would reverse the court's 
determination on Count I. 
                               III. 
         In Count II the government alleges that Stelmokas was 
ineligible for a visa because he voluntarily assisted the enemy 
forces in their operations against the United Nations.  The heart 
of this contention is that a finding of mere service in the 3rd Battalion 
(Schutzmannschaft) and in the 91st Light Flak 
Replacement Unit of the German Army was sufficient to meet the 
government's high burden of proof required for 
denaturalization.  I find this argument unpersuasive for two 
reasons. 
         First, the government relies on part II of the International 
Relief Organization (IRO) Constitution, incorporated into the 
Displaced Persons Act.  That provision precludes certain people 
from being considered for naturalization as follows. 
         Persons who will not be the concern of the organization: 
 
         2. Any person who can be shown:  
 
         . . . . 
          
         (b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the  
         outbreak of the second world war in their operations against 
         the United Nations. 
 
D.P.A. § 2(b), Pub. L. 80-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat. at 1009 
(incorporating IRO Constitution, Annex I, Part II).  An 
explanatory regulation later adopted by the Displaced Persons 
Commission (DPC) interprets "operations against the United 
Nations" as follows: 
         [Anyone who] has voluntarily borne arms in armed forces or 
         auxiliary organizations against the United States or its 
         Allies on the Western Front (including North Africa and 
         Italy) during that period of World War II beginning December 
         8, 1941; a person shall not be deemed so to have served 
         voluntarily if he establishes that he was compelled against 
         his will to serve in the armed forces or auxiliary 
         organizations, against the United States or its Allies on 
         the Western Front.  
 
8 C.F.R. § 702.8(f) (my emphasis).  The 3rd Battalion served in 
the occupied Baltic countries, not on the Western Front, and the 
complained of activities took place before December 7, 1941.  
Therefore, Stelmokas does not appear to be in that category of 
persons who assisted the enemy in military operations against the 
United States or its Allies in the Western Front. 
         Moreover, commentary to the IRO Constitution provides: 
         Mere continuance of normal and peaceful duties, not 
         performed with the specific purpose of aiding the enemy 
         against the Allies or against the civil population of 
         territory in enemy occupation, shall not be considered to 
         constitute "voluntary assistance."  
 
IRO Constitution, Annex I, Part II, 62 Stat. 3037, 3052.   
         At trial, direct testimony was adduced that normal 3rd 
Battalion duties included guarding stationary installations such 
as bridges, warehouses, government buildings, peatbogs, 
ammunition depots and communications facilities. A283-284. 
Official interpretations of Section 2(b) of the IRO Constitution, 
especially those limiting improper activities to those performed 
on the Western Front, required the OSI to produce more evidence 
than mere membership in a military or constabulary unit to 
support its contention in Count II.  See also the discussion in 
Part IV, post, exempting from "movement which is or has been 
hostile to the United States" service in military forces or local 
constabularies. Under these circumstances I would hold that the 
government failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain Count 
II. 
 
                               IV. 
         In Count III the government charges that Stelmokas 
participated in a movement hostile to the United States.  The 
district court concluded that mere participation in the 3rd 
Battalion was sufficient to warrant denaturalization and that the 
government met its burden by demonstrating that Stelmokas 
volunteered to serve in the 3rd Battalion, a LithuanianSchutzmannschaft, 
an organization on the U.S. government's 
Inimical List.  On this issue, I find unavailing both the 
government's argument and the district court's conclusion.  
         Although the government placed an Inimical List in evidence, 
A1644, it presented no evidence that mere membership in any 
organization on the List was sufficient to deny an applicant a 
visa.  Indeed, in addressing "the materiality issue or rejections 
under the inimical list," OSI trial counsel represented to the 
district court that it was necessary to present "the testimony of 
someone who was--who operated or applied it . . . ."  A723.  The 
district court made clear that explanatory testimony was 
mandatory: "It seems to me, with the list and with someone 
explaining how the list was utilized at the time of Mr. 
Stelmokas' application, yes, the answer is, it might [be 
relevant]."  Id.  This exchange clearly demonstrated the need for 
official explanation of how the List would have applied to 
persons seeking displaced-persons status.     
         Yet no such explanatory testimony was forthcoming.  The only 
evidence introduced was an Inimical List in the nude.  Although 
Appellant's counsel stipulated that it was an Inimical List and 
in effect at the relevant times, he did not stipulate that the 
DPC or the Consular Service would deny visas on the basis of mere 
membership in an organization on the List.  More important, the 
record is totally barren of testimony from any witness that 
membership in the Schutzmannschaft, in and of itself, would have 
been sufficient to deny displaced-person status in 1949. 
     Further, the federal regulation which governs § 13 of the 
Displaced Persons Act limits the disqualification of applicants 
for displaced-persons status to any person who: 
     (d) Is or has been a member of or participated in any 
     movement which is or has been hostile to the United States 
     or the form of government of the United States; such a 
     movement includes but is not limited to the communist, Nazi 
     or Fascist parties or political or subversive groups of an 
     ideological character similar to that of the aforementioned 
     parties; . . . . 
 
8 C.F.R. §702.8(d) (my emphasis).  By cable dated April 20, 1949, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson interpreted "movement" in § 13 of 
the Act not to include military forces or local constabularies.  
Appellant's Br., Exhibit A.  Significantly, at the time Stelmokas 
made his application in July, 1949, the Secretary of State's 
directive was in full force and effect.  Given that the 3rd 
Battalion operated very much as the local constabulary, 
Stelmokas' membership in that organization should not for 
purposes of § 13 be construed as membership in a "movement" 
hostile to the United States and its allies.   
    The government failed to produce testimony describing how 
the List was used.  There is not a smidgeon of evidence to 
indicate that mere membership in an organization named on the 
Inimical List was a sufficient basis on which to deny Stelmokas' 
visa application.  Moreover, Secretary Acheson's interpretation 
of "movement" indicates that Stelmokas' membership in the 3rd 
Battalion, a military force or constabulary, was not sufficient 
to trigger disqualification for displaced-persons status under 
the Displaced Persons Act.  Accordingly, the government has 
failed to meet its high burden of proving that Stelmokas, by mere 
membership in a local military or constabulary organization, 
voluntarily participated in a movement hostile to the United 
States.  I would therefore reverse the court's conclusion on 
Count III.   
 
                                V. 
    At the time of Stelmokas' immigration in July, 1949, U.S. 
State Department regulations prohibited issuing visas to any 
alien "who has advocated or acquiesced in activities or conduct 
contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf of the Axis 
countries."  22 C.F.R. § 53.33(j).  In Count V the government 
alleges that under this regulation Stelmokas was ineligible for a 
visa.  The government contends that he was ineligible first, 
because he failed to leave the 3rd Battalion and second, because 
he persecuted civilians on September 16-17 and October 28-29, 
1941.  I will address these arguments in turn. 
    The district court determined that Stelmokas' "failure to 
leave the Schutzmannschaft or to act on behalf of the Jews 
constituted acquiescence in conduct contrary to civilization."  
The court thus concluded that the government had met its burden 
on Count V.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 55-56.  The court erred.  More than 
mere membership in the Schutzmannschaft is necessary to prove 
conduct contrary to civilization and human decency.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court teaches that mere membership is not enough and that 
there must be proof of actual participation in such conduct.  The 
Court "focusing on whether particular conduct can be considered 
assisting in the persecution of civilians."  Fedorenko v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 490, 512-513 n.34 (1981).  Although it is 
undisputed that Stelmokas was a member of the 3rd Battalion, the 
record provides no evidence that he participated in conduct that 
amounted to persecution of civilians.  It is conduct in an 
organization, not mere membership, that determines culpability.  
    The government contends in Count V that Stelmokas acquiesced 
in conduct contrary to human decency by participating in the 
persecution of Jews on September 16-17 and October 28-29, 1941. 
As I have indicated in my discussion in Part II, the government 
did not meet its high burden of proving that Stelmokas actually 
participated in persecuting Jews on these dates.  Professor 
Hilberg's testimony is significant in this respect: "I did not 
see in any of the sequence of documents . . . anything that would 
indicate [sic (implicate?)] Stelmokas directly in the arrest, 
killing of Jews, but he is in the company in which these things 
are going on."  A626.  Passive accommodation of the Nazis, as 
distinguished from personal, active assistance in persecution, 
does not constitute conduct contrary to civilization and human 
decency.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512-513 n.34.  See also United 
States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 122-123 (2d Cir. 1985); Ofsua v. 
McElroy, 933 F. Supp. 237, 243-244 (S.D. N.Y. 1995.) 
    The government has not demonstrated that Stelmokas' mere 
membership in the 3rd Battalion constituted advocacy of, or 
acquiescence in, conduct contrary to civilization.  Moreover, the 
record is devoid of any competent or persuasive evidence that 
Stelmokas played a role in the persecution of Jews in September 
and October, 1941.  Thus, on Count V the government has failed to 
meet the high burden of proof required for denaturalization.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's determination 
on this issue. 
                               VI. 
    In Count VI the government charges Stelmokas with illegally 
procuring his citizenship because his membership in the 3rd 
Battalion and his participation in the persecutions of September 
and October, 1941 showed a lack of good character.  The district 
court found in favor of the government on the basis of Stelmokas' 
voluntary enlistment in the Schutzmannschaft and direct 
assistance and participation in the persecution of Jews in 
Lithuania.  The court concluded that these factors establish a 
lack of good moral character.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 56-57.   
    As I previously set forth in Part II, the government failed 
to prove that Stelmokas was voluntarily and directly involved in 
the persecution of Jews in September and October 1941.  Moreover, 
this court recently affirmed a district court's conclusion that 
determination of a person's moral character must rely on 
something more than superficial evidence of a person's status or 
title:  
    [T]he very essence of meaningfully determining a person's 
    moral character is not simply to look at their status or 
    title . . . but to examine the actor's conduct and the 
    circumstances surrounding it.  We refuse to revoke 
    citizenship by finding that a person prima facie lacks good 
    moral character simply because he held the title of 
    concentration camp guard without some further showing that 
    the person engaged in some morally reprehensible conduct and 
    did so voluntarily. 
United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1199 (E.D. Pa. 
1993), aff'd 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994.)  Absent evidence of any 
illegal conduct and based on nothing more than Stelmokas' mere 
membership in the 3rd Battalion, the government could not prove 
and the district court improperly concluded that he lacked the 
good moral character required for citizenship.  Accordingly, the 
court erred in granting judgment to the government on Count V. 
 
                              VII. 
    In Count IV the government alleges that Stelmokas' order and 
certificate of naturalization should be revoked 
    on the ground that such order and certificate of  
    naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by  
    concealment of a material fact or by willful  
    misrepresentation. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1451 (a).  In its complaint the government contended 
"that in failing to list his wartime residences and occupation, 
Stelmokas made a willful and material misrepresentation when 
applying for Displaced Person status as defined in § 10 of the 
Displaced Persons Act."  Compl. ¶¶ 57-58, 62.  The contention was 
an attempt to prevail on the "procured by" clause of § 1451(a), 
but the district court found against the government on that 
claim.  See note 1, ante.  The court found in favor of the 
government's claim brought under the "illegally procured" clause, 
concluding that: 
    Defendant's misrepresentations and concealments to the DPC  
    and the U.S. vice-consul were material because they  
    concealed the fact that defendant had assisted the enemy in  
    the persecution of civilians, had voluntarily assisted the  
    military operations of the Axis powers, and had been a  
    member of a movement hostile to the United States and  
    its form of government.   
 
Conc. Law 32.  
 
    From this the court concluded that Stelmokas was ineligible 
to immigrate pursuant § 10 of the DPA; that such ineligibility 
rendered his entry unlawful; and because his entry was unlawful, 
"his naturalization as a United States citizen on April 11, 1955 
was illegally procured."  Conc. Law 33.  
    The government's reliance on the "illegally procured" clause 
must not be evaluated in a vacuum.  The district court's ultimate 
determination is the conclusion of a polysyllogism with many 
premises omitted.  The polysyllogism begins with a major premise 
stating that §10 of the DPA barred from immigration any person 
who willfully misrepresented material facts in order to gain 
entry as a displaced person.  The argument next contends that 
Stelmokas made misprepresentations and because the 
misrepresentations were material, he was ineligible for entry; 
therefore, Stelmokas' actual entry was unlawful and his 
naturalization "illegally procured."  The critical inquiry is  
whether the government met its important threshold burden of 
proving a misrepresentation as defined in the Displaced Persons 
Act.  
                                A. 
    Our starting point is the statute: 
    Any person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for 
    the purpose of gaining admission into the United States as 
    an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be 
    admissible into the United States. 
D.P.A. § 10, Pub. L. No. 80-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).  
When Stelmokas applied for citizenship in 1949, eligibility 
investigations and reports were made only by the Displaced 
Persons Commission (DPC).  The Commission defined 
misrepresentation for the purpose of § 10 of the Act: 
    Misrepresentation.  "Misrepresentation for the purpose of 
    gaining admission into the United States" refers to a 
    willful misrepresentation, oral or written, to any person 
    while he is charged with the enforcement or administration 
    of any part of the Displaced Persons Act, of any matter 
    material to an alien's eligibility for any of the benefits 
    of the said Act. 
 
        8 C.F.R. § 700.11.  It is not disputed that Stelmokas 
misrepresented his wartime residences and occupation.  Thus, the 
first inquiry is whether those misrepresentations met the legal 
standard of materiality. 
    The Supreme Court established the current test in Kungys v. 
United States: 
    [A] concealment or misrepresentation is material if it `has 
    a natural tendency to influence or was capable of 
    influencing, the decision of' the decision making body to 
    which it was addressed . . . We hold, therefore, that the 
    test of whether Kungys' concealments or misrepresentations 
    were material is whether they had a natural tendency to 
    influence the decisions of the Immigration and 
    Naturalization Service. 
 
485 U.S. 759, 770-772 (1988)(citing, inter alia, Weinstock v. 
United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1956).  I concede 
that Stelmokas' failure to disclose his wartime military status 
would have had a natural tendency to influence immigration 
decisions.  However, as the Court made clear in Kungys and United 
States v. Gaudin,___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 2319 (1995), 
materiality is a mixed question of law and fact.  As in all mixed 
questions, the definition of the legal component must come first, 
followed by a presentation of facts against which the legal 
component must be measured. 
    In denaturalization cases, equally important to establishing 
a material statement is the presentation of evidence that the 
misrepresentation procured the order and certificate of 
naturalization.  See Gaudin, 115 S.Ct. at 2314.  This is the 
factual component of the mixed question.  Establishing at least a 
modicum of evidence on the procurement element is essential to 
the government's burden of proof.  
    In Kungys, a prototype of OSI prosecution, the defendant 
twice misrepresented his date and place of birth: once in 1947, 
when applying for a visa, and again in 1954, when petitioning for 
naturalization.  The Court approved dismissal of the government's 
complaint against Kungys because misrepresentations about his 
place of birth, wartime occupations and residence were not shown 
to be unequivocally material.  In addition to being required to 
demonstrate materiality as a matter of law, i.e., that a material 
statement was made, the government was obligated to demonstrate 
that Kungys' citizenship status was procured by his material 
misrepresentations.  The Government seems to ask this court to 
apply different meanings to the term "procured" in the two 
clauses of § 1451(a). 
    The government suggests that it has different ultimate 
burdens depending on whether "procured" applies to 
naturalizations that are "illegally procured" or to those 
"procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful 
misrepresentation."  There is no rational support for the 
suggestion that Congress intended such an anomalistic reading of 
the same word in the same section of the same statute.  There is 
absolutely no rational support for the notion that the government 
is not required to produce evidence showing precisely how 
Stelmokas was "unlawfully admitted" and whether his 
naturalization was in fact "illegally procured."  If under the 
second clause in § 1451 the government must show that the 
naturalization was "procured by" the alleged misrepresentation, 
as the Court held in Kungys, then under the first clause 
certainly the government must demonstrate that Stelmokas was 
ineligible and therefore unlawfully admitted.   
    The traditional procedure by which the government has shown  
ineligibility, used in every case it has brought excepting this 
one, is to proffer testimony that the applicant's naturalization, 
or Displaced Persons status, resulted from the alleged 
misrepresentations.  Even if we do not require the government to 
prove the visa or naturalization certificate would not have been 
granted but for the misrepresentations, until today courts have 
not permitted the government to proceed without any evidence 
whatsoever on the question of whether the misrepresentations 
procured the applicant's citizenship. 
    Indeed, the combined opinions of Justices Scalia and Brennan 
in Kungys, and Justice Scalia's opinion for a unanimous court in 
Gaudin, indicate that the government must establish by factual 
evidence how immigration officials interpreted and administered 
the immigration law during the period in question.  The 
government must show not only that the misrepresentation would 
have a "natural tendency to influence" the DPC analyst's 
decision, but also that the misrepresentation did in fact 
influence that decision.  Thus, Justice Scalia's opinion for the 
Kungys Court points out that § 1451(a) of the denaturalization 
statute contains four independent requirements:  
    the naturalized citizen must have [1] misrepresented or 
    concealed some fact, [2] the misrepresentation or 
    concealment must have been willful, [3] the fact must 
    have been material, and [4] the naturalized citizen 
    must have procured citizenship as a result of 
    misrepresentation and concealment. 
 
485 U.S. at 767 (my emphasis). 
    The requirements above must similarly be established in this 
case to prove the § 10 Displaced Persons Act allegations made by 
the government.  The repeated use of the word "procured" in both 
grounds for revoking naturalization under § 1451 makes clear 
Congress' intent to impose on the government the fourth 
requirement--that some nexus be established between the 
misrepresentation or unlawful conduct and the applicant's receipt 
of the naturalization certificate--regardless of the clause under 
which the government files suit. 
    I have acknowledged that the first three of the Kungysrequirements 
were met here.  In view of the Court's definition of 
materiality, Stelmokas' misrepresentations were material to the 
extent that they had "a natural tendency to influence the 
decisions."  Id. at 768.  The critical lack of proof in this case 
lies with the fourth requirement--that the misrepresentations 
did, in fact, result in ineligibility.  Without this critical 
factual base, the argument may not properly proceed to subsequent 
prosyllogisms and episyllogisms culminating in "unlawfully 
admitted" and "illegally procured." 
    The fourth requirement was not controverted in Kungysbecause the 
government produced the testimony of Ambassador 
Seymour Maxwell Finger, a former vice-consul at Stuttgart, 
Germany, who described how immigration officials had interpreted 
and administered the immigration law during the period in 
question.  See United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516, 530-31 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  Justice Brennan, who furnished the fifth vote for 
the majority in Kungys, emphasized in his concurring opinion that 
such testimony was essential.  485 U.S. at 783.  Thus, the 
precise holding in Kungys was that only after presentation of a 
prima facie factual case and a demonstration of materiality was  
the government entitled to a presumption that the applicant was 
ineligible for citizenship.  Justice Brennan's concurrence 
eloquently articulates his concern that the "precious right" of 
citizenship not be revoked unless the government has met its full 
evidentiary burden: 
         I agree with this construction of the statute.  I 
    wish to emphasize, however, that in my view a 
    presumption of ineligibility does not arise unless the 
    Government produces evidence sufficient to raise a fair 
    inference that a statutory disqualifying fact actually 
    existed.  It is this fair inference of ineligibility, 
    coupled with the fact that the citizen's 
    misrepresentation necessarily frustrated the 
    Government's investigative efforts, that in my mind 
    justifies the burden-shifting presumption the Court 
    employs.  Evidence that simply raises the possibility 
    that a disqualifying fact might have existed does not 
    entitle the Government to the benefit of a presumption 
    that the citizen was ineligible, for as we have 
    repeatedly emphasized, citizenship is a most precious 
    right, . . . and as such should never be forfeited on 
    the basis of mere speculation or suspicion. 
 
Id. at 783 (citation omitted).    
    Fatal to the OSI's argument in the case before us is the 
government's failure, in Justice Brennan's words, to "produce 
evidence sufficient to raise a fair inference of ineligibility."  
Id.  The absence of factual evidentiary support regarding 
ineligibility based on Stelmokas' statements renders wholly 
speculative the conclusion that such misrepresentations led to an 
unlawful admission to the United States and ultimately illegally 
procured his naturalization. 
    I find no inconsistency between the teachings in the 
opinions of the Court in Kungys and Gaudin, both authored by 
Justice Scalia.  In Kungys, a denaturalization case involving the 
second "procured by" clause of § 1451, the Court required 
presentation of factual evidence that "the naturalized citizen 
must have procured citizenship as a result of misrepresentation 
or concealment." 485 U.S. at 767.  It follows inexorably that 
when relying on the "illegally procured" clause, the government 
must also present evidence demonstrating that the admittee was 
ineligible for admission.  In Gaudin the Court stressed the 
necessity of developing the factual basis of "materiality" and 
emphasized that materiality is "a mixed question of law and fact 
[in which a characterization] for one purpose does not govern its 
characterization for all purposes."  115 S.Ct. at 2319. 
Similarly, the Court in Kungys stressed the importance of 
presenting facts on the issue of illegal procurement of 
citizenship by referring to the testimony of Ambassador Finger on 
how immigration officials interpreted and administered 
immigration law during that period.  Making reference to this in 
Gaudin, Justice Scalia described Kungys as an example where "the 
appellate court's newly asserted standard of materiality could be 
applied to the facts [of materiality] by the appellate court 
itself, instead of requiring remand to the District Court for 
that application."  Id. at 722; 115 S.Ct. at 2314. 
    In every successful OSI prosecution that I have researched, 
the government raised this fair inference by presenting evidence 
in two discrete respects: (1) evidence detailing wartime 
activities of the defendant; and (2) testimony from appropriate 
U.S. officials that had these activities been known to the 
Displaced Persons Commission analysts, the defendant's 
application would have been denied or subjected to additional 
investigation.  Indeed, every OSI prosecution that I researched 
contained testimony by officers of the Displaced Persons 
Commission, consular officers or both describing the effect that 
a particular misrepresentation would have had on the analysts 
examining the application.  This essential testimony sets forth 
whether the authorities would have granted, denied, or referred 
the application for further investigation, and it sets forth a 
prima facie case on whether the applicant's alleged 
misrepresentations procured the visa and naturalization decisions 
made by the officers.  
    In the leading Supreme Court cases that inform our 
denaturalization jurisprudence, the OSI presented witnesses who 
testified that the visa would not have been issued had the true 
facts been known.  In Fedorenko, vice consul Kempton Jenkins 
testified that the petitioner's service as an armed guard made 
him ineligible for a visa.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 498-99.  As 
discussed above, in Kungys, Ambassador Finger described how 
immigration officials interpreted and administered the 
immigration law during the relevant period.  Kungys, 793 F.2d at 
530-531.  Clearly the Supreme Court has underscored the necessity 
for "testimony about how the Act was interpreted by the officials 
who administered it."  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 511.   
    In short, in every prosecution brought by the OSI that I 
researched, including the Supreme Court decisions central to our 
jurisprudence in denaturalization matters, the OSI presented 
evidence not only that the alleged misrepresentations had a 
natural tendency to influence, but also that they did in fact so 
influence the visa decision--i.e., that the visa was procured by 
the applicant's misrepresentations.  Such evidence was starkly 
absent in the present matter and this absence is fatal to the 
OSI's argument that Stelmokas' naturalization was "unlawfully 
procured."     
    My personal research may be faulted.  Therefore, at oral 
argument I asked counsel for the OSI to examine the records of 
his office to determine whether any other OSI prosecutions have 
been presented without testimony by a representative of the 
Displaced Person Commission, the International Relief 
Organization or the consular service as to the effect of the 
misrepresentation on the applicant's procurement of citizenship.  
Counsel responded, "I will send you a letter one way or another, 
Judge Aldisert."  Although the government's counsel filed a 
supplemental brief following oral argument, the brief did not 
supply the information requested by the court.  Thus, I will draw 
the appropriate inference. 
                                B. 
    I have conceded that Stelmokas' misrepresentation of wartime 
activities would have had the "natural tendency to influence the 
decision" of DPC officials.  Therefore, the government met its 
burden of setting forth the legal component of the mixed 
materiality question.  However, the government has not met its 
high burden of proof in this case because it failed to produce 
evidence that Stelmokas' misrepresentations procured the decision 
of the DPC analyst and the naturalization officials.  The 
government failed to produce any prima facie evidence that the 
visa and naturalization decisions were procured by the alleged 
unlawful conduct. 
    Although no such evidence was presented to the district 
court, the court nonetheless concluded: 
    33. Defendant was ineligible to immigrate to the United 
    States pursuant to DPA § 10.  His entry to the United 
    States for permanent residence in 1949 was therefore 
    unlawful and his naturalization as a United States 
    citizen on April 11, 1995 was illegally procured.   
  
Dist. Ct. Op. at 54-55.  Here the court conflated a question of 
law with a question of fact.  It decided, and properly so, that  
the misrepresentation had a natural tendency to influence the 
decision making.  This was the question of law.  It then decided, 
as a matter of fact, that the misrepresentation did in fact 
influence and procure the government's visa decision and, 
therefore, subsequently procured unlawful naturalization.  The 
court erred here because the record was barren of any testimony 
regarding what factors procured his visa, let alone which types 
of misrepresentations would have made Stelmokas ineligible for 
entry at the time he applied.  That the procurement element in § 
1451 is a question of fact is set forth in Kungys in both the 
opinion of the Court and the concurring opinion of Justice 
Brennan; it is also established in Gaudin and reflected in OSI's 
universal practice of presenting testimony by officials as to the 
immigration policy of the United States at the relevant time. 
    By way of analogy, a trial judge in a murder case would hear 
the prosecution's evidence that, as a matter of law, a bullet 
fired from a defendant's Colt .45 had the natural tendency to 
cause death.  However, the prosecution still would have to prove 
that, as a matter of fact, a .45 bullet was a factor in the 
decedent's death.  Likewise, as an experienced judge reviewing 
matters having to do with State Department or immigration policy, 
I can decide as a matter of law the legal component of a mixed 
question of law and fact.  But it is absolutely necessary that, 
before I may properly perform that judicial function, some facts 
be developed against which the legal standard can be measured.  
    A fortiori, I confess ignorance as to the factual overlay of 
discretionary powers vested in immigration officials in the 
turbulent post-war years of the late 1940s.  I suggest that my 
distinguished judicial colleagues on this court, on the district 
court and on the Supreme Court also lack this information.  Such 
crucial factual information is not the stuff of which judicial 
notice is made; it is the stuff that must be presented as record 
evidence at a trial.  Yet the district court determined as a 
matter of law, without even a prima facie showing regarding 
relevant United States immigration policy, that "Defendant was 
ineligible to immigrate to the United States pursuant to the DPA 
§ 10."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 54.            
    The OSI failed to present any evidence on this count.  
Therefore, the district court was left to speculate about whether 
the DPA analyst in 1949 would have referred to the Inimical List, 
how the analyst would have interpreted it, and whether the 
analyst would have decided to grant, deny, or further investigate 
Stelmokas' visa application based on that List. Because the OSI 
failed to present any evidence, the court could only conjecture 
that the analyst would have thought conditions in occupied 
Lithuania justified a finding of ineligibility.  Because the OSI 
failed to present any evidence, the court had to surmise that the 
analyst would have found the 3rd, 11th or 253rd Battalion of the 
Lithuanian National Labor Defense Battalions actively assisted 
the Nazis in the persecution of civilian populations.   
     In short, the government failed to present any testimony by 
witnesses to prove an actual, a probable, or even a possible 
impact on the analyst's eligibility decision in July, 1949.  
Therefore, we are left to hypothesize.  Hypothesizing is no 
substitute for proof, especially where the burden is 
"substantially identical with that required in criminal cases-- 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  Klapprott v. United States, 
335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949).  Therefore, the judgment of unlawful 
procurement on Count IV must be reversed. 
                                  
                              VIII. 
    This too must be said.  In American jurisprudence there is 
no analogue to permitting a trial on events that occurred a half- 
century in the past.  Indeed, with the exception of murder cases, 
all criminal and civil proceedings are rigorously circumscribed 
by fixed statutes of limitations.  Such statutes preclude the 
institution of criminal or civil complaints after a finite number 
of years.  Similarly, in equity petitions, stale actions are 
barred by the doctrine of laches.   
    The policy that undergirds our statutory and judicial 
limitations on such actions is rooted in an understanding that 
with the passage of time, witnesses disappear and memories fade.  
Such a policy reflects appreciation for the reality that, because 
our memories are fragile and inevitably compromised by the 
ravages of time, at some point they can no longer be considered 
trustworthy for presentation under oath as "the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth."  It may well be that a half 
century after a Displaced Persons Commission's analyst examined 
the visa application of Jonas Stelmokas, witnesses are either no 
longer available or incapable of testifying as to the immigration 
practices of the United States in 1949.  This is the price that 
the government must pay for bringing any case so long after these 
events took place. 
    Given contemporary concepts of due process, it is doubtful 
that one could be tried in 1996 for a murder that took place in 
1941.  Nevertheless, the judiciary continues to permit the 
prosecution of stale denaturalization cases like this one.  
Perhaps this is because such cases embody a fundamental tension 
between two venerated precepts of the American legal tradition.  
One precept dictates that those responsible for the Holocaust be 
punished: that they be sought out in America and either 
extradited to Israel or denaturalized, deported and ultimately 
punished by the sovereignty where the despicable acts took place.  
The other precept demands full compliance with the letter and 
spirit of the American judicial process; it demands that a 
prosecution be held to every aspect of its burden of proof, 
particularly in so important a matter as a denaturalization 
proceeding.  Because such cherished values are at stake, decision 
by judicial fiat must never replace decision-making based on the 
presentation of evidence.  Thus, when we come to the intersection 
of such esteemed precepts, we must be especially vigilant to 
protect the procedures that lie at the heart of our judicial 
process, lest in our zeal to avenge the victims of the Holocaust, 
we unwittingly permit our judicial traditions to be victimized. 
    Those of us who sacrificed years of our youth in World War 
II to combat the forces of tyranny are understandably sensitive 
to these issues.  We are sensitive to the danger that fundamental 
values of our glorious American tradition, including the 
protections guaranteed by our legal system which we fought to 
preserve, might be compromised in a fervor to punish one who may 
have aided the bestiality of our common enemy.  We are especially 
sensitive when that effort to punish is initiated more than half 
a century after the last shot in anger was fired.  Certainly 
those who violate the rules of society must be punished, but 
society itself must never breach its own rules to achieve that 
end. 
      To continue the prosecution of octogenarians (and soon 
nonagenarians) is, to be sure, a political decision.  Such 
decisions are properly left to the exclusive discretion of our 
executive branch.  Nevertheless, if these prosecutions have not 
already pushed the envelope beyond traditional notions of due 
process, soon they will do just that.  There is no precedent in 
our tradition that permits a prosecution on events that occurred 
so far in the past.  Although I have grave doubts about the 
constitutionality of so stale a prosecution, I do not meet the 
due process issue here because I would grant relief on other 
grounds. 
    For all the foregoing reasons, I dissent.  I would reverse 
the judgment of the district court ordering denaturalization. 
 
 
 
